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Introduction 
The states have largely prevailed in their struggle against the 
federal government for control over marijuana policy. More than 
twenty states have already legalized marijuana for some purposes under 
state law, and the number is sure to grow.1 Though the federal 
government has not yet formally repealed its own marijuana 
prohibition,2 it has largely ceded control of the issue to the states.3   
† Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government, 
Vanderbilt University Law School (robert.mikos@vanderbilt.edu). I thank 
Jonathan Adler, Jonathan Caulkins, Paul Edelman, Sam Kamin, Beau 
Kilmer, Pat Oglesby, Rosalie Pacula, Christopher Serkin, and partici-
pants at the Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States Symposium at 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Drug Law and 
Policy Roundtable at Vanderbilt University Law School, for helpful 
comments. I also thank Andrea Alexander and Alex Nourafshan for dili-
gent research assistance.  
1. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter NCSL 
Marijuana], http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-
laws.aspx. 
2. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2012). 
3. See Staff of H. Rules Committee, 113th Cong., Text of House 
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 213–14 (2014) 
(instructing that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act to the 
Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent . . . States from 
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”); Dep’t of the 
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But the states are now facing growing opposition from within their 
own borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s perceived harms, many 
local communities in marijuana legalization states are seeking to 
reinstate marijuana prohibitions at the local level.4 Communities in at 
least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local 
bans on marijuana dispensaries.5 Even in Colorado, arguably the state 
with the most liberal marijuana policies, more than 150 municipalities 
have passed ordinances banning the commercial sale of marijuana.6 And 
countless other communities that otherwise welcome or at least tolerate 
the marijuana industry are nonetheless attempting to regulate it, 
imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the location, size, 
hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local 
vendors.7  
 
Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Fin-2014-G001, 
BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses 
(2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/
FIN-2014-G001.pdf (signaling that FinCEN will allow banks to provide 
financial services to some marijuana dealers, notwithstanding the 
stringent federal ban on the drug); Memorandum from James M. Cole, 
Att’y General, to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforce-
ment (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/reso
urces/3052013829132756857467.pdf (signaling that the DOJ will not 
prosecute marijuana dealers who comply with state law and do not 
implicate other federal enforcement priorities).  
4. See e.g., Eric M. Johnson, Local Bans Try to Put Lid on Washington 
State Pot Shop Investors, REUTERS (May 13, 2014), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2014/05/13/usa-marijuana-washington-idUSL2N0NS04W20 
140513 (reporting that “nearly 50 municipalities [in Washington] have 
enacted bans, moratoria and restrictive zoning ordinances, largely citing 
fears of a federal crackdown, their children getting high, and costly 
enforcement”); Jacob Sullum, Will Local Bans Undermine Marijuana 
Legalization in Washington?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/01/24/will-local-bans-undermine-
marijuana-legalization-in-washington/ (reporting that several cities in 
Washington “have banned marijuana businesses, while more than 20 
others have imposed moratoriums”). 
5. The states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how the states have 
responded to local bans. 
6. Jon Murray & John Aguilar, Colorado Cities and Towns Take Diverging 
Paths on Recreational Marijuana, The Denver Post (Dec. 27, 2014); 
COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, Summary of Local Retail 
Marijuana Actions: Thru Fall 2014, http://www.cml.org/Issues/El
ections/Election-Results/Election-Results-Retail-Marijuana/.  
7. For very helpful surveys of the regulations now being imposed by local 
governments, see Jeremy Nemeth & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana: 
The Cananbis Conundrum, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 6 (Aug. 2014) and 
Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: 
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These local ordinances raise one of the most important and unre-
solved questions surrounding marijuana law reforms: What power, if 
any, should states give local governments to regulate marijuana? How 
the states choose to answer this question will not only influence the 
content and pace of reforms, but could also have a dramatic impact on 
the overall level of popular satisfaction with marijuana policy. 
Proponents of localism suggest that local communities can do a better 
job of tailoring marijuana policies to suit the preferences of local 
majorities8—the same argument that states have employed to wrest 
control from the national government.9 In other words, locals are simply 
saying that what’s good for the goose is good for the gosling. 
But there is one important difference between localism and feder-
alism: States have far greater influence over localities than the federal 
government has over the states. The states have a degree of 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy from federal interference. This is 
why they have been able to legalize marijuana, notwithstanding the 
federal government’s strict ban on the drug10 and claims that state 
legalization has imposed negative externalities on neighboring states.11 
In other words, the federal government could not stop the states from 
 
Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 Planning & Envir. L. 
3 (Aug. 2010).  
8. E.g., City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness 
Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 508 (Cal. 2013) (suggesting that “while some 
counties and cities might consider themselves well suited to accommo-
dating medical marijuana dispensaries, conditions in other communities 
might lead to the reasonable decision that such facilities within their 
borders, even if carefully sited, well managed, and closely monitored, 
would present unacceptable local risks and burdens”).  
9. See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal 
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1305 
(1994) [hereinafter Briffault, Normative and Formal Concerns] (“[T]he 
values said to be advanced by federalism are not distinctively associated 
with the states. Many of these values—increasing opportunities for 
political participation, keeping government close to the people, inter-
governmental competition, the representation of diverse interests—may 
be served better by local governments than by states.”). See also Heather 
K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 
4 (2010) (urging scholars to consider the potential benefits of devolving 
authority onto a multitude of government actors, including localities).  
10. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana 
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1419 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy] for 
an in-depth explanation of how the states won the war for control over 
marijuana policy.  
11. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion regarding claims that Colorado-
sourced marijuana is flooding neighboring states.  
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legalizing marijuana even if it sorely wanted to.12 In contrast, local 
governments have no similar constitutional protection against state 
interference, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. This 
means states could conceivably prevent local governments from 
meddling with state marijuana policy, if they deemed local control 
normatively undesirable.13 The only real question then is what should 
the states do?  
Despite the importance and very live nature of the local authority 
question, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to it. Most 
marijuana legalization states have simply failed to address local 
authority when crafting their marijuana laws, including recent 
reforms.14 This means the issue is being resolved through costly and 
lengthy litigation.15 Indeed, in many states, the issue of local control 
remains unsettled.16 And while many scholars have weighed in on the 
federalism issues surrounding marijuana law reforms (including yours 
 
12. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1423–24 
(“States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not 
preempted—and more importantly, may not preempt—state laws that 
merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private conduct the federal 
government deems objectionable.”). 
13. See infra Part IV.A. 
14. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how states have addressed the 
marijuana localism question. 
15. There have been dozens of lawsuits filed challenging local bans on 
marijuana, and state courts have reached starkly different conclusions 
regarding the propriety of those bans. Compare City of Riverside v. Inland 
Empire Patients Health and Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494 (Cal. 2013) 
(upholding a local ban on retail medical marijuana shops, notwithstanding 
California’s Compassionate Use Act) with Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 
846 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 2014) (striking a local ban on marijuana 
cultivation as preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act). 
16. For example, the attorney general of Washington recently issued an 
opinion declaring that state Initiative-502, which legalized recreational 
marijuana in 2012, does not preempt local bans on marijuana shops. See 
Letter from Robert W. Ferguson, Att’y General of Washington, to the 
Hon. Sharon Foster, Chair, Washington State Liquor Control Board, 
Whether Statewide Initiative Establishing System for Licensing 
Marijuana Producers, Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordi-
nances 2 (Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/FosterAGO2014No02.pdf (concluding that “[l]ocal 
governments have broad authority to regulate within their jurisdictions, 
and nothing in [the state initiative] limits that authority with respect to 
licensed marijuana businesses”). But state license applicants have sued to 
block local bans, and it is unclear whether the courts will agree with the 
state attorney general’s conclusion. See State Attorney General Seeks to 
Join Marijuana Lawsuits in Fife, Wenatchee to Defend I-502, Kent 
Reporter (July 31, 2014), http://www.kentreporter.com/news/269420
451.html (noting the Washington attorney general’s intervention in three 
lawsuits challenging city ordinances that ban marijuana shops).  
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truly),17 they have all but ignored the important power battles now 
flaring up within the states.18  
This Article begins to fill the gap. It aims to provide lawmakers, 
jurists, scholars, and other interested parties insights into the 
desirability of enabling local communities to regulate the sale of 
marijuana. I focus on local power over marijuana sales because it is the 
most salient localism battleground today. Notably, no state has yet 
allowed a local government to ban the simple possession of the drug 
where state law permits such possession.19 Even local bans on personal 
cultivation of the drug appear suspect under state law.20 Nonetheless, 
 
17. See generally, e.g., William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513 (2015); Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 
62 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 74 (2015); Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the 
(State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 
Fla. L. Rev. 2279 (2014); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and 
Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015); Sam Kamin & Eli 
Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 Or. L. Rev. 869 
(2013); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the 
War on Drugs, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 507 (2006); Ernest A. 
Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist 
Revival After Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. For my own work 
analyzing federalism issues surrounding marijuana law reforms, see 
Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. 
Health Care L. & Pol’y 5 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption 
Under the Controlled Substances Act]; Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of 
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans, 
Cato Pol’y Analysis, Dec. 2012, at 1, available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf; Robert 
A. Mikos, Can States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government? 161 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (2012); Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the 
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 997 (2012); 
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New 
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 633 (2011); 
Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other 
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. Chi. Legal. F. 223 (2010) [hereinafter Mikos, 
State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution]; Mikos, On the Limits of 
Supremacy, supra note 10.  
18. There are at least two notable exceptions. See Nemeth & Ross, Planning 
for Marijuana, supra note 7; Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets 
Zoning, supra note 7.  
19. For example, Amendment 64 expressly declares that it “shall not be an 
offense under Colorado law or the law of any locality within Colorado” for 
anyone twenty-one years of age or older to possess one ounce or less of 
marijuana. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a) (emphasis added).  
20. Id. § 16(3)(b) (stating that there will be no penalty under the law of any 
locality for “[p]ossessing, growing, processing, or transporting no more 
than six marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, flowering 
plants, and possession of the marijuana produced by the plants on the 
premises where the plants were grown, provided that the growing takes 
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this Article could be used to gauge the desirability of local power over 
these and other issues as well, should the need arise. 
The Article approaches its task in three steps. First, it discusses 
the economic theory of localism, focusing on the primary economic 
rationale behind localism decisions: the desire to maximize satisfaction 
with government policy. Under this theory, localism’s net impact on 
preference satisfaction hinges on the relative strength of two competing 
considerations: (1) the degree to which local communities disagree 
about how to regulate a given activity; and (2) the degree to which 
local communities absorb the full costs and benefits of the regulated 
activity—or, to put it another way, the degree to which people are 
likely to care about how the activity is being regulated elsewhere.  
Second, the Article attempts to gauge the strength of these 
competing considerations when it comes to regulating marijuana sales. 
The Article suggests that local communities do indeed disagree about 
how to regulate marijuana sales, as evidenced by the divergent policies 
they are now pursuing and the local votes in recent elections. At the 
same time, however, the Article suggests that local communities do not 
absorb the full costs and benefits of local marijuana sales. The reason 
is that residents of one community can easily purchase marijuana in 
other communities and consume it there or back home. Easy access to 
marijuana in neighboring communities threatens to undermine the 
efficacy of many local marijuana regulations and thus the ability of 
local governments to satisfy the policy preferences of large 
constituencies.  
Third, the Article develops a case study of local alcohol control and 
mines this case study for lessons about local marijuana control. It is, of 
course, far too early to gauge the impact of local marijuana regulations. 
But we do have more than one century worth of experience with local 
alcohol regulations. I argue that this experience holds some valuable 
lessons for debates over marijuana localism. In particular, I suggest our 
experience with local alcohol control should temper enthusiasm for 
giving local government similar control over marijuana. The research 
on local alcohol control suggests that local alcohol regulations often 
have effects outside of the communities that adopt them.21 For example, 
one community’s decision to go “wet” could thwart a neighboring dry 
community’s efforts to curb alcohol consumption and the harms that 
go along with it. Likewise, one community’s decision to go “dry” might 
simply shift more alcohol consumption and its attendant harms into a 
neighboring wet community. The sobering experience with local alcohol 
control suggests that the state or even the national government might 
be better suited to control alcohol and, by extension, perhaps marijuana 
as well.  
 
place in an enclosed, locked space, is not conducted openly or publicly, 
and is not made available for sale”).  
21. See infra Part III. 
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Importantly, the Article remains deliberately neutral regarding 
whether marijuana distribution should be legal or illegal. It focuses 
instead on who should decide. I contend that the answer to that 
question ought to be the same regardless of its impact on the reach and 
pace of legalization. The state should allocate policymaking authority 
to whichever level of government is likely to please the largest number 
of people. To be sure, presently, localism would appear to favor one 
side—it enables prohibitionists to preserve islands of prohibition in 
states where the tide has clearly turned against them. But it is 
important to recognize that local power could just as easily be used to 
legalize as to prohibit marijuana. Indeed, citing frustration with the 
pace of state-level reforms, local communities in several states are now 
attempting to legalize marijuana, notwithstanding state prohibitions on 
the drug.22 Localism thus arguably holds some appeal for both sides in 
marijuana policy debates. For this reason, if no other, it might be 
possible for decisionmakers to allocate authority between state and 
local governments without necessarily being influenced by expectations 
of how that authority will be exercised at the present moment.  
The Article could also generate important insights for marijuana 
federalism. Since states too have porous borders, marijuana smuggling 
 
22. In Michigan, for example, eight cities recently voted to legalize possession 
and distribution of recreational marijuana under city law; the state, so 
far, has only legalized medical marijuana. See City of Berkley Marijuana 
Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, 
http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Berkley_Marijuana_Decriminalization
_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Hazel Park Marijuana Decrim-
inalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://bal 
lotpedia.org/City_of_Hazel_Park_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Prop
osal_(August_2014); City of Huntington Woods Marijuana Decriminaliz-
ation Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
City_of_Huntington_Woods_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal
_(November_2014); City of Mount Pleasant Marijuana Decriminaliz-
ation Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
City_of_Mount_Pleasant_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(N
ovember_2014); City of Oak Park Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal 
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Oak_ 
Park_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(August_2014); City of 
Pleasant Ridge Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), 
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Pleasant_Ridge_Mari 
juana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Port 
Huron Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), 
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Port_Huron_Marijuana 
_Decriminalization_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Saginaw 
Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, 
http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Saginaw_Marijuana_Decriminalization
_Proposal_(November_2014).  
 In similar fashion, many local governments sought to legalize sales of 
alcohol before the repeal of state and national prohibitions. See David E. 
Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition 54 (2d ed. 2000).  
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and marijuana tourism threaten to undermine satisfaction with their 
policies as well. Indeed, Nebraska and Oklahoma have filed a lawsuit 
against Colorado claiming the Rocky Mountain State has imposed 
various costs upon its neighbors:  
The diversion of marijuana from Colorado contradicts the clear 
Congressional intent, frustrates the federal interest in eliminating 
commercial transactions in the interstate controlled-substances 
market, and is particularly burdensome for neighboring states like 
Plaintiff States where law enforcement agencies and the citizens 
have endured the substantial expansion of Colorado marijuana.23 
For reasons I’ve explained elsewhere, marijuana federalism may pose 
more of an academic question for now24—but it could resurface if 
support for marijuana legalization continues to grow.25  
In addition to contributing to the debate over marijuana law and 
policy, this Article also adds to the body of localism scholarship. 
Following in the footsteps of recent works analyzing local control of 
domains as diverse as firearms and hydraulic fracturing,26 this Article 
provides a case study to apply and refine the more abstract principles 
of localism theory. Perhaps one of the most important takeaways from 
these works is that the case for or against localism is rarely as clear cut 
as in the highly stylized hypotheticals commonly employed in the 
classroom.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the theoretical 
framework for evaluating the desirability of local control. Part II 
discusses the strength of the two competing considerations surrounding 
the decision whether or not to grant local governments power to 
regulate marijuana sales: (1) the distinctiveness of local marijuana 
policy preferences; and (2) the impact of local marijuana sales on 
outsiders. Part III then discusses the lessons of local alcohol control. 
 
23. Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 22O144 ORG, 6 (U.S. docketed 
Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
24. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1445–50 
(explaining that the anticommandeering rule prevents Congress from 
preempting state marijuana legalization).  
25. If it had the political support to pass new legislation, for example, 
Congress could preempt state marijuana bans and force states to legalize 
marijuana. See Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 
supra note 17, at 15–17 (explaining that the anticommandeering rule does 
not prevent Congress from preempting state interference with the private 
market).  
26. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. 82 (2013) 
(making a case for local control over firearm regulation—and providing 
the inspiration for the title of this piece!); David B. Spence, The Political 
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 351, 377–78 (2014) (making 
an equivocal case for local control over fracking). 
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Part IV makes some tentative recommendations concerning whether 
states should devolve control of marijuana policy onto local 
governments. 
I. Localism Theory  
This Part provides a quick primer on localism theory. For purposes 
of this Article, I focus on the economic theory of localism. This theory 
strives to maximize total satisfaction with government policy.27 To that 
end, it asks which level of government, state or local, would maximize 
the combined utility of all residents of the state.28 Maximizing prefer-
ence satisfaction is not, of course, the only—or, indeed, even necessarily 
a good—rationale for localism,29 but it is one of the most commonly 
invoked rationales for local control. So for now, I will focus exclusively 
on localism’s impact on satisfaction with government policy, leaving 
other considerations for another day. 
Localism’s net impact on preference satisfaction depends on the 
strength of two competing considerations.30 On the one hand, localism  
27. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
Pol. Econ. 416, 416 (1956) (arguing that “local[ism] . . . reflects the 
preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected 
at the national level”); Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 11–13 
(1972) (arguing that decentralization achieves a higher degree of prefer-
ence satisfaction); Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignor-
ance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter 152–54 (2013) (exam-
ining the informational benefits of “foot voting”). 
28. I recognize this is not the only method of aggregating preferences. See 
Wulf Gaertner, A Primer on Social Choice Theory 9–12 (2006) 
(discussing competing approaches).  
29. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local 
Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, 490 (1999) (arguing that local 
governments are more than “insular forums for registering the private 
preferences of the persons who inhabit them” and can serve as “important 
political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours 
of ‘ordinary civic life in a free society’”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: 
Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 393–99 
(1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (discussing claims 
that localism enhances political participation); Richard T. Ford, The 
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1841, 1861 (1994) (arguing that “contemporary local government 
law perpetuates the historically imposed segregation of the races”); Gerald 
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1067–68 
(1980) (arguing that the case for localism “does not rest on the view that 
local autonomy is the only, or even the most efficient, way to solve local 
problems” and suggesting instead that localism is desirable because it 
enables individuals “to participate actively in the basic societal decisions 
that affect one’s life”).  
30. These two considerations are implicit in the theory’s conclusion that regu-
latory authority should be allocated to the smallest unit of government 
that can capture the full costs and benefits of regulated activity. See 
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could potentially boost preference satisfaction if local communities in 
the same state disagree about policy. Each state is comprised of a large 
number of local communities.31 When some of those communities 
disagree with the way the state would handle an issue, localism enables 
them to pursue the policy their own majorities would prefer.32 By giving 
communities the opportunity to opt out of a state policy that some find 
disagreeable, localism should satisfy a larger number of state residents 
overall.33 
Professor Michael McConnell has developed a helpful hypothetical 
to illustrate the preference-satisfaction benefits of decentralization.34 
Although McConnell originally used this hypothetical to make the  
case for federalism, it is arguably even better suited to make the case 
for localism.35 Adapted for that purpose, the hypothetical asks the 
reader to 
 
Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 137 (2010) 
(arguing that power in a federal system should be assigned to “the 
smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its exercise”). 
See also Spence, supra note 26, at 377 (“There is a long tradition in 
economics, positive theory, and other quasi-utilitarian traditions of 
examining jurisdictional conflicts . . . using the matching principle, which 
would house regulatory authority at the lowest level of government that 
encompasses (geographically) the costs and benefits of the regulated 
activity.”). 
31. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1114 (2007) 
(noting that there are more than 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities 
dispersed across the fifty states). 
32. The assumption, of course, is that state government must apply the same 
policy throughout the state. If this assumption does not hold—in other 
words, if the state could adjust its own policy to suit local preferences—
the preference satisfaction benefits of localism would disappear. Cf. 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903 (1994) (arguing that the federal 
government could achieve the same preference-satisfaction benefits 
commonly attributed to federalism by simply adjusting federal policy to 
suit state conditions).  
33. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 375–78 (discussing 
the posited comparative advantage of localism over federalism). See also 
sources cited supra note 27.  
 Localism does not, of course, benefit everyone in a state and for that 
reason is not Pareto efficient; instead, the idea is that the number of 
people who gain from localism outnumber the number who lose, making 
it Kaldor-Hicks efficient if we ignore the nettlesome problem of 
interpersonal utility comparisons. 
34. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1494 (1987). 
35. See Briffault, Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, supra note 9, at 1305 (arguing that “many . . . of [the] values 
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assume that there are only two [cities], with equal populations of 
100 each. Assume further that 70 percent of [City] A, and only 
40 percent of [City] B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. 
The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a [state] basis 
by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. 
If a separate decision is made by majorities in each [city], 130 will 
be pleased, and only 70 displeased.36 
 Mobility could further enhance preference satisfaction under local-
ism. After all, residents who are unhappy with one locality’s policy 
could potentially move to another locality that espouses a different, 
more agreeable policy.37 McConnell notes in his example that “[t]he 
level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in [City] A 
decide to move to [City] B, and some anti-smokers in [City] B decide 
to move to [City] A.”38 To be sure, residents could also relocate to other 
states as well as localities. But the relatively large number of localities 
increases the odds that residents will find one with a more agreeable 
policy and also reduces the costs associated with relocation across state 
lines.39  
On the other hand, localism could potentially diminish satisfaction 
with government policy if some residents care about what happens 
outside their home communities. For a variety of reasons, people 
commonly do care about what is going on in other communities. For 
example, those happenings might harm them physically—think of lung 
disease caused by pollution emanating from a neighboring town’s 
factory—as well as psychologically—think of the disgust felt upon 
hearing of ISIS beheadings halfway across the globe. Judge David 
Barron has aptly remarked that “no city or state is an island 
jurisdiction. The ability of each locality to make effective decisions on 
its own is inevitably shaped by its relation to other cities and 
states . . . .”40  
When people care about what happens elsewhere, localism will not 
necessarily increase total satisfaction in the state and could even 
diminish it. This is because localism requires surrendering a degree of 
control over activities occurring elsewhere. In McConnell’s 
hypothetical, for example, the people of City A could not ban smoking 
 
said to be advanced by federalism . . . may be served better by local 
governments than by states”). 
36. McConnell, supra note 34, at 1494. 
37. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 27, at 152–54 (noting the benefits of “foot 
voting”).  
38. McConnell, supra note 34, at 1494.  
39. Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 400–35. 
40. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke 
L.J. 377, 378–79 (2001).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Marijuana Localism 
730 
in City B, nor could City B legalize smoking in City A. McConnell’s 
case for decentralization thus rests on the assumption that the residents 
of City A do not care about City B’s policy and vice versa. This might 
be a fair assumption to make for an issue like smoking policy. But the 
same assumption does not hold for policies governing other activities. 
Imagine, for example, that City B decided to allow a local factory to 
dump toxic pollutants into a river, contaminating the water supply of 
downstream City A. Notwithstanding their apathy toward City B’s 
smoking policy, the residents of City A would care about City B’s 
pollution policy.41  
Ultimately, the problem is that local communities have no incentive 
to consider the costs and benefits of local activity that are borne by 
outsiders.42 This means that the interests of local communities and the 
interests of the entire state do not necessarily coincide, and we cannot 
trust local communities to regulate activities in a way that will 
maximize the total satisfaction of the entire state. In particular, when 
local activity imposes costs on outsiders, local authorities will allow or 
produce too much of it. (The example of the factory in City B polluting 
City A’s water supply fits the bill). And when local activity instead 
confers benefits on outsiders, local authorities will allow or produce too 
little of it.  
* * * 
To summarize, localism enables each community to pursue the 
policy that maximizes its own well-being. And as long as local activity 
does not affect outsiders to the community, regulation motivated by 
local interests will also maximize the well-being of the state. But when 
local activity imposes costs or benefits on those outsiders, local 
communities will not necessarily adopt the policies that maximize the 
state’s well-being. The normative case for localism thus hinges on the 
strength of two competing considerations: (1) the degree to which local 
communities disagree about how to regulate a given activity, and (2) 
the degree to which local communities absorb the full costs and benefits 
of the regulated activity. Ceteris parabis, the stronger is the former 
consideration, the stronger will be the case for local control. Conversely, 
the stronger is the latter consideration, the stronger will be the case for 
state control. I argue that states should consider these criteria when 
deciding whether to grant local communities authority over marijuana. 
 
41. Economists label these concerns externalities, which, for present purposes, 
are costs or benefits associated with a local activity or policy that are 
borne by nonconsenting outsiders.  
42. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 434 (“Local 
governments will not, as long as they need not, take extralocal effects into 
account, give a voice to nonresidents affected by local actions, internalize 
externalities, make compensatory payments for negative spillovers or 
transfer local wealth to other communities in the region to ameliorate 
fiscal disparities.”). 
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The next Part thus explores the strength of these two considerations 
when it comes to marijuana sales.  
II. Marijuana Localism 
This Part evaluates the case for and against local control of 
marijuana sales policy using the two economic criteria discussed above. 
Namely, I examine the extent to which majority preferences toward 
marijuana sales policy differ across local jurisdictions and the extent to 
which local marijuana sales have effects outside the point-of-sale 
community. As noted above, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list 
of the criteria needed to evaluate marijuana localism. But these 
economic considerations offer a good place to start our assessment of 
the normative desirability of marijuana localism.  
A. The Case For  
This Section demonstrates that local communities do indeed prefer 
different policies toward marijuana sales. But it also suggests that the 
gains associated with marijuana localism could prove to be small and 
temporary.  
It seems safe to posit that communities disagree about how to 
regulate marijuana sales. The best evidence stems from the fact that 
local communities have adopted starkly different policies toward 
marijuana stores. In Colorado, for example, 165 municipalities have 
voted to ban retail marijuana stores, but another fifty-three 
municipalities have voted to permit them.43 Marijuana stores garnered 
as little as 21 percent support and as much as 65 percent support in 
the most recent round of local referenda.44 Even among Colorado  
43. See Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6 for a detailed breakdown of Colorado. 
44. In 2014, voters in eight Colorado cities considered local initiatives to 
legalize marijuana stores as permitted by Amendment 64. Local Mari-
juana on the Ballot, Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Local_mari 
juana_on_the_ballot. Majorities in two of those cities voted to approve 
marijuana stores, while majorities in the other six cities voted to prohibit 
them. Id. The cities and vote shares (prohibit-allow) are Cañon City (61–
39), Canon City Marijuana Legalization, Measure 2C (November 2014), 
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Ca%C3%B1on_City_Marijuana_ 
Retail_Legalization,_Measure_2C_(November_2014); Lakewood (54–
46), Town of Lakewood Marijuana Retail Ban, Measure 2A (November 
2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Lakewood_Mari 
juana_Retail_Ban,_Measure_2A_(November_2014); Manitou Springs 
(35–65), City of Manitou Spring Retail Marijuana Ban, Measure 2G 
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_ 
Manitou_Springs_Retail_Marijuana_Ban,_Measure_2G_(November_
2014); Palisade (50.3–49.7), Town of Palisade Retail Marijuana 
Legalization, Measure 2A (November 2014), Ballotpedia, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Palisade_Retail_Marijuana_Legalizat
ion,_Measure_2A_(November_2014); Palmer Lake (53–47), Town of 
Palmer Lake Recreational Marijuana Retail Ban, Measure 301 
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communities that allow marijuana stores, there is some differentiation 
in policy. For example, only half of the fifty-three municipalities that 
permit retail marijuana shops have chosen to levy special local taxes on 
marijuana sales.45 And to varying degrees communities in Colorado and 
elsewhere restrict the number, location, size, and hours of operation of 
locally permitted marijuana stores.46 
The passage of different policies arguably reflects the distinctive 
beliefs, priorities, and conditions of local communities. To simplify 
somewhat, communities that have banned marijuana dispensaries fear 
the stores fuel marijuana consumption47 and all the harms they 
attribute to it, and that they also attract “crime, congestion, blight, 
and drug abuse”48 to surrounding neighborhoods. Communities that 
allow dispensaries might share some of these concerns, but they prefer 
less-draconian means to address them, for example, keeping stores away 
from areas frequented by children.49 Communities that allow marijuana 
stores also see an upside to them. The stores provide medicine for 
 
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_ 
Palmer_Lake_Recreational_Marijuana_Retail_Ban,_Measure_301_(
November_2014); Paonia (53–47), Town of Paonia Marijuana Retail 
Legalization Referendum, Measure 2B (November 2014), Ballot-
pedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Paonia_Marijuana_Retail_Le
galization_Referendum,_Measure_2B_(November_2014); Ramah (79–
21) Town of Ramah Marijuana Retail Legalization, Measure 2B 
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_ 
Ramah_Marijuana_Retail_Legalization,_Measure_2B_(November_20
14); and Red Cliff (36–64), Town of Red Cliff Marijuana Retail Ban, 
Question 2G (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Town_of_Red_Cliff_Marijuana_Retail_Ban,_Question_2G_(Novem
ber_2014). 
45. Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6. 
46. Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 8–11 (cataloging the regulations imposed 
on medical marijuana dispensaries by several communities across the 
country). 
47. See Hunter Stuart, One-Quarter of Washington’s Towns Still Ban 
Marijuana, The Huffington Post, Jul. 8, 2014 (“Having a retail 
recreation store sends the wrong message to kids.”) (quoting Dale Brown).  
48. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Ctr., 
Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 508 (Cal. 2013) (adopting argument made by amici 
curiae to support a local ban on medical marijuana dispensaries). See also 
Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 7 (noting strong NIMBY opposition to 
marijuana stores). 
49. See Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the “main intent” of 
restrictions on the day to day operations of medical marijuana 
dispensaries is “to limit feared secondary impacts” of the stores, 
“especially crime, underage use, or diversion to the ‘black market’”). 
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seriously-ill patients, recreation for consenting adults, tax revenues for 
cash-strapped local governments, or jobs for local workers.50 
The results of statewide elections further demonstrate the existence 
of divergent local policy preferences in this domain. In statewide 
elections, local communities have commonly staked out opposing 
positions on marijuana ballot initiatives. Consider the vote on 
Colorado’s Amendment 64. In total, more than one-half (55.3%) of 
Colorado voters favored Amendment 64.51 But a majority of voters in 
thirty out of Colorado’s sixty-four counties actually opposed 
Amendment 64.52 Marijuana ballot initiatives in other states have 
proven similarly divisive at the local level.53 
Given these disagreements, localism theory suggests that more 
people might be satisfied if their local government rather than the state 
(or national) government controlled marijuana sales policy. The results 
of those aforementioned statewide elections could even help estimate 
the magnitude of the preference-satisfaction gains to be had from mari-
juana localism. To that end, I compared the number of people in the 
local majority on state marijuana measures to the number of people in 
the statewide majority on the same measures. The differences provide 
a very rough approximation of the number of voters who might gain 
from marijuana localism in the states. While this methodology has 
obvious shortcomings, like ignoring the intensity of voter preferences 
and ignoring policy alternatives not considered on state ballots, it 
should generate some insight into the strength of the case for marijuana 
localism. 
 
50. See id. at 7 (discussing perceived job and tax revenue rationale animating 
local ordinances allowing marijuana dispensaries). 
51. Amendments and Proposition Results, Colorado Secretary of 
State [hereinafter Colorado Amendments and Proposition Results], 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/ 
general/amendProp.html (receiving 1,383,140 out of 2,500,034 votes). 
52. Id. 
53. For example, in California, twelve of fifty-eight counties supported 
Proposition 19 in 2010. State Ballot Measures by County, California 
Secretary of State (2010), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2010-
general/88-state-ballot-measures.pdf. In Washington, 20 of 39 counties 
supported Initiative 502 in 2012. November 06, 2012 General Election 
Results, Washington Secretary of State, (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502-
Concerns-marijuana_ByCounty.html [hereinafter Washington Voting 
Results on Initiative 502]. Finally, in Oregon, 14 of 36 counties supported 
Measure 91 in 2014. General Election, Official Abstract of Votes: Measure 
91, Oregon Secretary of State (2014) [hereinafter Oregon Abstract 
of Votes: Measure 91], http://www.oregonvotes.gov/doc/history/nov42 
014/91.pdf.  
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Consider, first, the county-by-county vote on Colorado’s 
Amendment 64.54 In the 2012 election, 1,383,140 Coloradoans voted for 
Amendment 64 and were presumably satisfied with the outcome; 
another 1,116,894 Coloradoans voted against Amendment 64 and were 
presumably dissatisfied with the outcome.55 In total, a net 266,246 more 
Coloradoans preferred the new state policy (legalization) over the old 
one (prohibition). But the county-by-county vote suggests that even 
more people would have been satisfied by localism. Majorities in thirty 
of Colorado’s sixty-four counties actually opposed Amendment 64. In 
these counties, the total number of “no” votes (215,973) exceeded the 
total number of “yes” votes (181,369) by 34,604. This suggests that a 
net of 34,604 Coloradoans might have been happier under localism.56 
While the results on Amendment 64 might be indicative only of 
Colorado circa 2012, the county-by-county votes on marijuana ballot 
measures in other states tell a very similar story. Table 1 displays data 
from four of the most recent statewide marijuana ballot initiatives in 
which county level votes were readily available.57 
  
 
54. All of the Colorado election figures are pulled from State of Colo., 
Office of the Sec’y of State, 2012 Abstract of Votes Cast 145 
(2012) [hereinafter Colorado Voting Results on Amendment 64], 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/booklet
.pdf.  
55. Id. 
56. To put it another way, 34,604 is the difference between the sum of the 
countywide majority vote on Amendment 64 (1,417,744) and the total 
statewide majority vote on the Amendment 64 (1,383,140). Colorado 
Voting Results on Amendment 64, supra note 54, at 145.  
57. All data in the table are pulled from Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement 
of Vote: November 2, 2010, General Election 88–90 (2011) 
[hereinafter California Voting Results on Proposition 19], http://elect 
ions.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf; Colorado 
Amendments and Proposition Results, supra note 51; Oregon Abstract of 
Votes: Measure 91, supra note 53; Washington Voting Results on 
Initiative 502, supra note 53.  
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Table 1 
State 
Majority 
voters at 
state 
level 
Majority 
voters at 
county 
level 
Differ-
ence 
    
California Prop 19 (2010) 5,333,230 5,558,225 224,995 
  53.5% 55.7% 2.3% 
    
Colorado Amendment 64 (2012) 1,383,140 1,417,744 34,604 
 55.3% 56.7% 1.4% 
    
Oregon Measure 91 (2014) 847,865 880,527 32,662 
 56.1% 58.3% 2.2% 
    
Washington I-502 (2012) 1,724,209 1,770,284 46,075 
 55.7% 57.2% 1.5% 
 
The second column shows the number and percentage of state voters 
who were in the majority at the state level; the third column shows the 
number and percentage of voters in the majority at the county level; 
and the final column shows the difference between the first two figures, 
which provides a rough approximation of the net increase in satisfied 
voters under localism. As the table shows, to date, the number of 
potential beneficiaries of marijuana localism expressed as a percentage 
of state voters has been remarkably consistent across the states, 
amounting to roughly 2 percent of a state’s voting population. This is 
not a trivial gain, but it is far less than the 10 percent net gain posited 
by McConnell’s hypothetical above.58 The gains from marijuana 
localism appear to be somewhat small because opposition to state 
legalization measures has been concentrated in more thinly populated 
counties. In Colorado, for example, five of the seven smallest counties 
but not one of the seven largest counties opposed Amendment 64.59  
In theory, of course, the number of people who benefit from localism 
would be even larger and the case for localism correspondingly stronger 
if some dissatisfied residents relocated to communities espousing more 
like-minded preferences toward marijuana regulation. After all, 
estimating the number of people who benefit from localism using only 
the votes they cast in an election fails to count anyone who benefits 
from localism by voting with their feet instead.60 Nonetheless, I suspect  
58. In the hypothetical, twenty more voters out of 200 total were more 
satisfied by local versus state control. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 
1494. 
59. The ten smallest counties comprised only .23% of voters while the ten 
largest counties comprised 66.9% of voters. Colorado Voting Results on 
Amendment 64, supra note 54, at 145. 
60. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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few people actually change residences solely on account of local 
marijuana sales policy. For most people, marijuana is not an important 
enough issue to justify incurring the costs of permanent relocation,61 
especially when, as I suggest below, they can easily take advantage of 
neighboring community’s laws without relocating there.  
Likewise, the number of people who benefit from marijuana 
localism could prove even smaller than the vote tallies suggested. One 
reason is that preferences toward marijuana policy are rapidly 
changing. The disagreements that now divide local communities could 
resolve themselves over time, in which case localism would produce only 
temporary gains.62 Consider, for example, how the controversy over 
medical marijuana has largely disappeared among the general public. 
More than 80 percent of Americans now support legalization of 
marijuana for medical purposes.63 Localism might have held some 
appeal for the medical marijuana issue twenty years ago when the 
public was somewhat more divided, but that appeal has waned along 
with opposition to medical use of the drug.64 In a similar way, localism 
has arguably lost much of its appeal in the realm of alcohol policy. In 
1935, nearly 1,000 counties voted to opt out of statewide legalization of  
61. GfK Pub. Affairs & Corporate Commc’ns, The AP-GfK Sept. 
2014 Poll: All Questions, 19 (2014), http://surveys.ap.org/data/Gf
K/AP-GfK_Poll_September_2014_Topline_ALL.pdf (reporting that 
12% of respondents consider laws regarding marijuana an “extremely 
important” personal issue; 14% consider it a “very important” personal 
issue; 24% consider it a “moderately important” personal issue; 21% 
consider it “slightly important”; and 28% consider it “not at all 
important”).  
62. To be sure, the passage of local policies might play a role in facilitating 
such convergence of opinion. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, 
supra note 10, at 1471–72 (discussing the possible impact state marijuana 
laws have had on public opinion toward the drug).  
63. See e.g., Survey: General Public, Christian Young Adults Divided On 
Marijuana Legalization, Pub. Religion Research Inst., Apr. 25, 
2013, http://publicreligion.org/research/2013/04/april-2013-prri-rns-
survey/ (80% favor legalization of medical marijuana). 
64. Polls from the mid-1990s reveal that the public was more divided over 
medical marijuana then than it is today. See, e.g., Wired/Merrill Lynch 
Forum Digital Citizen Survey, Sept. 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from 
the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_acc
ess/ipoll/ipoll.html (62% favor legalizing medical marijuana); ABC News 
Poll, May, 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from the iPOLL Databank, The 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll
.html (70% favor legalizing medical marijuana); Americans Assess 
Medical Marijuana Survey, Mar, 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from the 
iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_acc 
ess/ipoll/ipoll.html (22% favor legalizing medical marijuana).  
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alcohol sales, but by 1970 that number had shrunk to around 600 
counties,65 and it has continued to drop ever since.66  
  
In sum, at first glance, marijuana localism looks appealing. Local 
communities clearly disagree about how to regulate marijuana. It 
appears that more people would be happy living under locally tailored 
marijuana policies than would be happy living under a single 
state-crafted marijuana policy, though the difference appears somewhat 
small and may prove temporary. But the case for localism so far has 
rested on the assumption that local voters do not care about marijuana 
policies adopted outside their home jurisdictions. The next Part 
challenges this assumption and thus casts doubt upon the normative 
case for marijuana localism.  
B. The Case Against 
Localism could potentially reduce overall satisfaction with 
government policy if people care about the marijuana policies adopted 
by other communities. This Section suggests there are at least two 
reasons people will mind what other communities do. Marijuana users 
can smuggle marijuana in from neighboring communities (marijuana 
smuggling), and marijuana users can travel out to neighboring 
communities to consume the drug (marijuana tourism). Both marijuana 
smuggling and marijuana tourism threaten to undermine the efficacy 
of many local controls and thus satisfaction with marijuana localism 
among a large segment of the population. 
1. Marijuana Smuggling 
In a world of divergent local marijuana policies, marijuana 
smuggling could undermine all but the most lenient of them. All mari-
juana regulations impose costs on the drug. Marijuana prohibition 
imposes risk premiums on those who supply the drug; these risk 
premiums are passed along to consumers in the price of the drugs they 
buy. Marijuana taxes and other business regulations, such as licensing 
requirements, also raise the price of the drug, though perhaps to a lesser 
extent. The problem for governments is that marijuana consumers have 
strong incentives to avoid these costs, and the availability of cheaper 
marijuana in neighboring jurisdictions—especially nearby local 
jurisdictions—gives them an easy means by which to do so.  
 
65. Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Endogenous Policy Decen-
tralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism, 110 J. 
Pol. Econ. 1, 8–12 (2002) (providing data on a number of dry counties 
from 1935 to 1970).  
66. See Reagan Baughman et al., Slippery When Wet: The Effects of Local 
Alcohol Access Laws on Highway Safety, 20 J. Health & Econ. 1089, 
1091–92 (2001) (reporting that from 1975 to 1996, thirty-three dry Texas 
counties voted to legalize alcohol sales).  
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For reasons both legal and practical, smuggling marijuana between 
local communities is easy. To begin, local residents have a 
constitutional “right to travel and to take advantage of the legal 
entitlements of neighboring jurisdictions.”67 As Professor Seth Kreimer 
eloquently explains,  
[T]he American Constitution as reformulated after the Civil War 
contemplates a national citizenship which gives to each of its 
members the right to travel to other states where, on a basis of 
equality with local residents, they can take advantage of the 
economic, cultural and moral options permitted there. The effort 
of any political subdivision of the nation to coerce its citizens into 
abjuring the opportunities offered by its neighbors is an affront 
not only to the federal system, but to the rights that the citizens 
hold as members of the nation itself.68 
Thus, a community may not bar its residents from buying marijuana 
somewhere else, even if it chooses to ban marijuana inside its own 
borders. For example, if Aurora, Colorado, prohibits retail marijuana 
sales, it may not stop its residents from buying the drug next door in 
Denver, where sales are legal.69 
 The United States Constitution would allow local governments to 
bar the importation and possession of “noxious” goods in its borders, 
but it appears that no state has yet actually empowered a local 
community to ban the simple possession or even importation of 
marijuana bought legally elsewhere in the state.70 In any event, even if 
a state did allow localities to ban possession and transportation of 
marijuana purchased in another community, residents would face little 
practical difficulty buying marijuana elsewhere and bringing it back 
home. The costs of making the trip to another community would be 
 
67. Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the 
Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 451, 462 (1992). See also I. Glenn Cohen, 
Circumvention Tourism, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1309 (2012) (examining 
comprehensively the right to travel to circumvent domestic prohibitions 
on accessing certain medical services that are legal in the patient’s 
destination country but illegal in the patient’s home country).  
68. Kreimer, supra note 67, at 519. 
69. Aurora only recently decided to lift its ban on marijuana retail stores. See 
Carlos Illescas, Aurora to Start Pot Sales, but Stores Not Ready, The 
Denver Post, Sept. 28, 2014, at 5B (reporting that Aurora lifted its ban 
on October 1, 2014). 
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
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negligible71 as legal marijuana stores may sit just feet outside the 
resident’s jurisdiction.72 Moreover, the marijuana could be easily 
concealed for the trip home,73 meaning the resident would face little 
risk of being caught by local police in possession of marijuana from 
another jurisdiction. The resident could further limit this risk and the 
size of the sanction she would face by limiting the quantities she 
smuggles, which is only a minimal inconvenience, considering that even 
 
71. As Jonathan Caulkins points out, “[d]rugs are enormously valuable per 
unit weight, so conventional transportation costs are negligible.” Jona-
than P. Caulkins, Domestic Geographic Variation in Illicit Drug Prices, 
37 J. Urb. Econ. 38, 39 (1995).  
72. For example, several of Denver’s 100+ licensed marijuana shops are 
located just outside the city limits of Aurora. A map of Denver’s licensed 
marijuana shops can be found at Retail Marijuana Lic-
enses, Denver Bus. Licensing Ctr., http://www.denvergov.org/busin
esslicensing/DenverBusinessLicensingCenter/MarijuanaLicenses/RetailM
arijuana/tabid/445028/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 To be sure, not every community will be as closely situated to its 
doppelganger as Denver and Aurora. And not surprisingly, smuggling 
poses less of a concern for more isolated communities. See, e.g., Matthew 
Berman et al., Alcohol Control and Injury Death in Alaska Native 
Communities: Wet, Damp, and Dry under Alaska’s Local Option Law, 61 
J. of Studies on Alcohol 311, 318 (2000) (concluding that 
“community-based alcohol control under the Alaska local option law has 
likely had some effect in moderating the elevated risk of injury death for 
Alaska Natives living in small remote communities”); Darryl S. Wood & 
Paul J. Gruenewald, Local Alcohol Prohibition, Police Presence and 
Serious Injury in Isolated Alaska Native Villages, 101 Addiction 393, 
400 (2006) (confirming the findings of earlier studies that local alcohol 
prohibitions reduced violent crime among isolated Alaska Native Amer-
ican communities).  
73. See, e.g., Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., Arizona: Drug Threat 
Assessment 22 (2003), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs6/63
84/6384p.pdf (noting that smugglers can conceal marijuana in “specially 
designed hidden compartments within . . . vehicles . . . includ[ing] bump-
ers, tires, gas tanks, quarter panels, seats, spare tires, and engine 
compartments [or] in duffel bags or luggage within the trunk or on the 
floor or seat of the vehicle[, or by] commingl[ing] marijuana with 
legitimate cargo such as fruits and vegetables”); Experts Say Drug Mules 
Are Easy to Find, Hard to Catch, NBC News (May 30, 2013), 
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/30/18589533-experts-say-drug-
mules-are-easy-to-find-hard-to-catch?lite (“The stash spots can be 
incredibly difficult to detect. Entire gas tanks can be removed and 
replaced with a bundle of drugs, or a back bumper can be filled with 
packages. Customs and Border Protection regularly announces seizures of 
narcotics hidden in creative receptacles like statues of Jesus, shoe heels or 
hair-spray cans.”). 
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heavy users consume less than two grams daily.74 And in the unlikely 
event she is caught with a small quantity of marijuana (say, twenty-
eight grams or less), the resident would, at worst, likely face only simple 
possession charges.75 For all of these reasons, the expected sanction for 
smuggling marijuana across local communities is likely to be extremely 
low.76  
Indeed, marijuana is commonly smuggled through less porous bor-
ders and across longer distances than those separating communities in 
the same state. Much of the marijuana consumed in the United States 
is smuggled all the way from Mexico,77 and states like Nebraska and 
Oklahoma claim they have “dealt with a significant influx of Colorado-
source marijuana” since the state legalized commercial sales of the 
drug.78 Though it is wise to take such claims with a grain of salt, the 
Colorado Department of Revenue itself estimates that out-of-state 
residents bought between eight and ten tons of marijuana legally in 
 
74. Beau Kilmer et al., RAND Corp., Before the Grand Opening: 
Measuring Washington State’s Marijuana Market in the Last 
Year Before Legalized Commercial Sales 11–12 (2013). 
75. Even the federal government might treat this as a mere civil infraction, 
at least the first time around. See 21 U.S.C. § 844a (2012) (authorizing 
federal prosecutors to treat simple possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana as a civil infraction). 
76. Whether the expected sanction will be enough to deter such smuggling 
depends on the difference in the price of marijuana in different commun-
ities. It is possible that communities could deter smuggling from neigh-
boring communities imposing only slightly more lenient regulations be-
cause the price differential will be small. But deterring smuggling from 
neighboring communities espousing significantly more lenient regulations 
will be considerably more difficult.  
77. See Beau Kilmer et al., RAND Corp., Reducing Drug Trafficking 
Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana 
in California Help? 7, 16 (2010) (noting that “at least 50 percent of 
the commercial-grade marijuana consumed in the United States comes 
from Mexico”). 
78. Complaint, supra note 23, at 25; see also Brief in Support of Motion for 
Leave to File Complaint at 8, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 
22O144 ORG (U.S. docketed Dec. 18, 2014) (“Since Amendment 64 took 
effect, Plaintiff States’ law enforcement have encountered Colorado 
marijuana on a routine basis, confirming that significant amounts of 
Colorado-sourced marijuana are being diverted to Plaintiff States.”); id. 
(“Amendment 64 . . . established Colorado as a marijuana source for the 
rest of the country.”). See also Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., 
Considering Marijuana Legalization: Insights for Vermont and 
Other Jurisdictions 136 (2015) (suggesting that legalizing marijuana 
in tiny Vermont could “alter availability [of marijuana] for at least one-
quarter of the nation’s users”) (emphases added); id. at 137 (“Total 
marijuana spending by out-of-state users living within a radius of 200 
miles of Vermont could well reach or exceed $5 billion per year.”). 
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Colorado in 2014,79 and it reports that out-of-staters comprised nearly 
one-half of the roughly 2,500 customers served by a Denver marijuana 
store in the course of a single week.80 Federal drug enforcement agencies 
also report a nearly 400 percent increase in the number of seizures of 
Colorado sourced marijuana destined for other states between 2009 and 
2012—a period following the proliferation of medical marijuana stores 
in Colorado but before the first recreational marijuana stores had even 
opened their doors.81 
For local communities and possibly even for states and nations, it 
is just not feasible to prevent cheap marijuana from being smuggled 
across their borders. In their suit against Colorado, for example, 
Nebraska and Oklahoma claim they have had to invest substantial new 
resources in their unsuccessful attempt to stem the tide of marijuana 
flowing in from Colorado:  
The result of increased Colorado-sourced marijuana being traff-
icked in Plaintiff States due to the passage and implementation 
of Colorado Amendment 64 has been the diversion of a significant 
amount of the personnel time, budget, and resources of the 
Plaintiff States’ law enforcement, judicial system, and penal 
system resources to counteract the increased trafficking and 
transportation of Colorado-sourced marijuana.82  
Not surprisingly, Nebraska and Oklahoma would probably prefer that 
Colorado shut off the water at the spigot instead—recall that a single 
 
79. Miles K. Light et al., The Marijuana Policy Group, Market Size 
and Demand for Marijuana in Colorado 26 (2014).  
80. Id. at 25 (reporting that 44.5% of the customers were out-of-staters). See 
also Aaron Smith, Tourists Flock to Colorado to Smoke Legal 
Weed, CNN Money (Aug. 22, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/2
2/smallbusiness/marijuana-tourism-colorado/ (reporting that a Colorado 
marijuana shop owner attributed 70% of business to out-of-state 
customers, with another shop owner attributing at least one-third).  
 While those out-of-staters did not necessarily take all of the marijuana 
they bought in Colorado back home, Colorado’s restrictions on public 
consumption of the drug made it tough for them to consume all of it in 
Colorado. See Retail Marijuana Use Within the City of Denver, 
Colorado: The Official Web Portal (last visited Jan. 31, 
2015) https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/marijuanainfodenver/residents-
visitors (detailing limits imposed on the consumption of marijuana) 
[hereinafter Denver Marijuana Use]. 
81. Rocky Mountain HIDTA, The Legalization of Marijuana in 
Colorado: The Impact 38 (2013) (comparing the number of inter-
diction seizures involving Colorado marijuana from 2005 to 2008 and 2009 
to 2012). 
82. Complaint, supra note 23, at 26. 
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marijuana store in Denver serves thousands of customers every week.83 
But that preferred strategy is simply unavailable to local communities 
and even states and nations when the source of a drug lay outside their 
borders. 
Marijuana smuggling threatens to undermine the policy objectives 
of local communities and hence their satisfaction with localism. For one 
thing, smuggling could undermine the efforts of some communities to 
curb consumption of marijuana and all of the harms those communities 
attribute (rightly or wrongly) to such consumption, including 
intellectual and motivational impairment, heart attacks, psychoses, 
traffic accidents, and moral corruption, to name a few.84 As explained 
above, one goal of local regulation is to raise the price of marijuana and 
thereby reduce its consumption among residents. But if local 
regulations can be evaded by shopping at a marijuana store located in 
the town next door, those local regulations will not work as intended. 
And if local marijuana regulations do not actually work as intended, 
marijuana localism will not boost preference satisfaction in communities 
that adopt the regulations and might even diminish satisfaction.85  
 
83. As I have explained elsewhere,  
 Targeting suppliers as opposed to users has two obvious advantages. 
First, there are far fewer of them. . . . Second, the penalties for cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana are significantly higher than for simple 
possession, the charge most users would face . . . meaning that expected 
legal sanctions will be high even if the probability of being detected  
by . . . law enforcement is not. 
 Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1467. See also 
United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992) (“If the 
government concentrates on eliminating the problem early in the 
distribution cycle, then it will be less necessary to control drug possession 
later when the numbers of retailers and users has multiplied. In addition, 
if the problem is addressed at an early stage, then it is less likely that the 
drug will ever reach users, and the consequent problems of drug use would 
be commensurately diminished.”).  
84. See Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 
76 Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. II) 
[hereinafter Denial of Marijuana Rescheduling] (discussing the harms that 
the Drug Enforcement Agency attributes to marijuana use).  
 The reader might take a very different view of marijuana’s harms. But 
the very premise of localism is that local governments ought to be allowed 
to reach different conclusions about such matters. Some local communities 
will base their policies on unsubstantiated views, but as long as they 
absorb the full costs and benefits of their decisions, they should be allowed 
to make that choice.  
85. See Edward L. Powers & Janet K. Wilson, Access Denied: The Relation-
ship Between Alcohol Prohibition and Driving Under the Influence, 74 
Soc. Inquiry 318, 318–19 (2004) (making the point for alcohol policy).  
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To be sure, local communities could attempt to achieve some of 
their policy objectives by means other than controlling the supply of 
marijuana. For example, a community could establish more sobriety 
checkpoints to combat driving under the influence. But many commun-
ities would not deem such measures to be perfect substitutes for source 
controls. For one thing, as noted above, they might believe that 
controlling marijuana at its source is a cheaper or more effective 
strategy compared to combatting harmful behaviors associated with use 
of the drug. In addition, harm-reduction measures like sobriety 
checkpoints will not necessarily address all of the harms local residents 
attribute to marijuana use; think of accidents that take place in the 
home or the moral corruption some people believe inheres in the use of 
substances like marijuana.  
Local communities that ban the sale of marijuana might have more 
luck deflecting the “crime, congestion, blight, and drug abuse” they 
associate with dispensaries onto other communities. But as discussed in 
more detail below, that does not represent a gain to society.86 
In addition to undermining efforts to combat consumption, mari-
juana smuggling could also undermine efforts to collect local taxes on 
the drug. Enthusiasm for marijuana legalization has been fueled at least 
in part by the promise of new tax revenues from sales of legal 
marijuana.87 Many states have already imposed their own taxes on the 
drug, but local jurisdictions are now trying to get in on the act. As 
noted above, twenty-seven of the fifty-three municipalities that have 
legalized marijuana sales in Colorado have levied local add-on taxes on 
sales of marijuana.88 For example, Denver imposes an 8.25% tax on 
retail marijuana sales on top of Colorado’s 12.90% tax (for a combined 
rate of 21.15%).89 Now suppose that Aurora decides to legalize com-
mercial marijuana sales. But to capture some of Denver’s marijuana  
86. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 
687 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (condemning Iowa law limiting the 
length of trucks on the state’s highways because it was designed to shift 
traffic onto other states and thereby “promote Iowa’s safety and other 
interests at the direct expense of the safety and other interests of 
neighboring States”). 
87. See Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution, supra note 17, at 
223–24 (noting the prospect of new tax revenue bolsters the appeal of 
marijuana legalization).  
88. Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6. 
89. See Denver Dep’t of Fin., Denver Combined Tax Rates (201) 
(observing that the combined tax rate for 2015 includes a 7.15% Denver 
tax; a 1.00% RTD (Regional Transportation District) tax; and a 0.10% 
Cultural Facilities District tax). It is worth noting that Colorado also 
imposes a 15% excise tax on wholesale marijuana. See Colorado Dep’t of 
Rev., Taxpayer Svcs. Div., Excise 23: Excise Tax on Retail Marijuana 
(Apr. 2014), available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default 
/files/Excise23.pdf. 
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business, suppose Aurora decides not to impose its own local tax on the 
drug.90 Since a portion of the state sales tax would be returned to 
Aurora anyway, the city would not necessarily need to impose an 
additional local tax to help fill its coffers.91 It would hardly be surprising 
if some Denverites now made the short trip to Aurora to buy marijuana. 
In so doing they could evade Denver’s comparatively steep local tax 
and save a tidy sum in the process (marijuana costs roughly $200–400 
an ounce).92 Indeed, in a recent report Professor Jonathan Caulkins and 
his co-authors conclude that “the idea that individual states can 
function as separate policy laboratories is optimistic.”93 They warn that 
the budgetary impacts of legalizing marijuana in one state (Vermont) 
“are highly uncertain and depend very much on what neighboring 
states do about their own marijuana policies.”94 Indeed, they suggest 
that “it might only take one of the lower 48 states breaking ranks and 
charging low marijuana taxes to challenge tax collections in the other 
states.”95 Experience with local tobacco cigarette taxes likewise suggests 
local communities will have a very difficult time collecting marijuana 
taxes that are out of sync with those imposed by nearby jurisdictions. 
For example, it is estimated that roughly 75% of all tobacco cigarettes 
consumed by New York City residents are purchased outside city limits 
in order to evade the city’s steep cigarette taxes.96 At the very least, 
the threat of smuggling likely imposes a ceiling on the effective tax rate 
that any local community can realistically expect to collect on 
marijuana.  
Ultimately, the problem with marijuana localism is that marijuana 
sold legally in one community imposes costs on other communities, and  
90. In fact, Aurora has decided to allow its newly legalized marijuana stores 
to remain open three hours later than Denver rivals in order to attract 
more business from Denver residents. See Illescas, supra note 69. 
91. See Legis. Council of the Colo. General Assemb., 2013 State 
Ballot Information Booklet 19–27 (2013) (describing the allocation 
scheme for state marijuana sales tax under Proposition AA). 
92. Philip Ross, Marijuana Costs in the US: How Black Market, Retail and 
Medical Pot Prices Compare, Int’l Bus. Times (July 8, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-costs-us-how-black-market-retail-
medical-pot-prices-compare-1622362.  
93. See Caulkins et al., Considering Marijuana Legalization, supra 
note 78, at 115 (emphasis added). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 142.  
96. See Editorial, Cigarette Tax Burnout, The Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 2008, 
at A14 (discussing how high state cigarette taxes often cause cigarettes 
to be purchased out of state). The tax gap for state cigarette taxes is 
generally lower. See Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution, 
supra note 17, at 243–44 (discussing the findings of cigarette tax evasion 
studies).  
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the point-of-sale community will not necessarily consider these costs 
when deciding how to regulate marijuana distribution.97 Nebraska and 
Oklahoma have emphasized the smuggling concerns in their suit against 
Colorado: “[m]arijuana flows from [the legal gap created by 
Amendment 64] into neighboring states, undermining Plaintiff States’ 
own marijuana bans, draining their treasuries, and placing stress on 
their criminal justice systems.”98 As one Nebraska Sheriff explains, 
“Every time we stop somebody, that’s taking up my deputy’s time with 
your Colorado pot. . . . We have to pay overtime, pay the prosecutor, 
pay to incarcerate them, pay for their defense if they’re indigent. 
Colorado’s taxing it, but everybody else is paying the price.”99 In light 
of concerns over smuggling, there is no reason to expect that local 
communities will necessarily adopt marijuana policies that boost 
societal welfare.  
2. Marijuana Tourism 
A related problem confronting local communities stems from mari-
juana tourism. Marijuana tourism occurs when residents travel to a 
neighboring locality not only to buy marijuana but also to consume it 
there as well. As noted above, residents have a constitutional right to 
travel to other jurisdictions “to take advantage of the legal entitle-
ments” thereof, including, presumably, the right to consume marijuana 
to the same extent as locals.100  
For the reasons discussed above, it is easy for residents to travel to 
neighboring communities to buy marijuana. It is clear that marijuana 
dispensaries do a brisk business with nonlocal residents.101 In addition 
to dispensaries, other businesses have sprouted up to cater to the 
marijuana tourism industry. For example, one tour bus operator is 
offering regular $400 round-trip service from Dallas, Texas, to one of 
Denver’s marijuana shops.102  
Marijuana tourism threatens to impose costs on both home and 
destination jurisdictions. For home jurisdictions, marijuana tourism 
could create the same problems caused by marijuana smuggling even if 
residents never smuggle the drug back home. The psychoactive 
chemical found in marijuana (THC) can impair cognitive functioning  
97. In fact, the point-of-sale community might not even recognize some of 
those “costs” as such. After all, it might allow marijuana sales precisely 
because it has formed a more positive assessment of marijuana’s harms 
than have its neighbors. 
98. Complaint, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
99. See Marc Fisher, A Dividing Line, Wash. Post, July 26, 2014, at A1 
(quoting Nebraska Sheriff Mark Overman). 
100. See Kreimer, supra note 67, at 462.  
101. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
102. Smith, supra note 80. 
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for hours, some even claim weeks, after use.103 Hence, it is possible that 
marijuana could impair driving, learning, productivity, and so on in 
one community long after it was consumed somewhere else. For 
example, a Colorado Springs resident might legally consume marijuana 
at a club in Denver, then drive seventy miles back home and strike a 
pedestrian in Colorado Springs. The harm to Colorado Springs is the 
same regardless of where the consumption occurred.  
Even long after the acute effects of marijuana wear off, users might 
experience latent harms caused by long-term chronic use of the drug. 
Under the right circumstances, these latent harms could cause concerns 
in outside communities. For example, suppose a young Colorado 
Springs resident goes on regular weekend marijuana binges in Denver; 
now suppose she takes no physical risks while there, but after several 
months of heavy use, she suffers permanent neurological damage. As a 
result, she might need medical care, special tutoring, and other social 
services—all paid for by her domicile (Colorado Springs) rather than 
by her weekend destination (Denver). 
More controversially, the use of marijuana by local residents in 
neighboring communities could also cause moral harms back home. 
Some people object to drug use by others for religious or other moral 
reasons. To them, drug use constitutes a sinful indulgence, a debase-
ment of the soul (to paraphrase James Q. Wilson).104 They feel morally 
indignant when other people use drugs, whether or not such drug use 
causes them, or anyone else, physical injury.105 Even readers who do not 
share this worldview might empathize a bit by thinking of the grief or 
 
103. Bengt Halvorson, Pot Smoking Could Affect Driving for Weeks, 
Researchers Suggest, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2013, http://www.washing 
tonpost.com/cars/pot-smoking-could-affect-driving-for-weeks-researchers 
-suggest/2013/03/05/1e10733e-85c5-11e2-a80b-3edc779b676f_story.html 
aw (reporting on a study that indicates that “cannabis can be detected in 
the blood, at a level that might affect driving, for weeks after the last 
‘intake’”). See also Denial of Marijuana Rescheduling, supra note 84, at 
40582 (citing studies suggesting that marijuana use can affect airplane 
pilot performance even twenty-four hours after consumption).  
104. James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, Commentary, Feb. 
1990, at 21, 26 (“Tobacco shortens one’s life, cocaine debases it. Nicotine 
alters one’s habits, cocaine alters one’s soul.”). See also William Bennett, 
The Plea to Legalize Drugs Is a Siren Call to Surrender, in Drugs and 
Society 339 (Michael Lyman & Gary Potter eds., 1991) (“The simple 
fact is drug use is wrong. And the moral argument, in the end, is the most 
compelling.”). 
105. The widespread rejection of harm-reduction drug policies in the United 
States suggests that many people might care more about these moral 
harms than about the physical harms associated with drug use. See 
Wilson, supra note 104, at 26 (arguing that because “dependency on 
certain mind-altering drugs is a moral issue and [because] their illegality 
rests in part on their immorality, then legalizing them undercuts, if it 
does not eliminate altogether, the moral message”). 
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anger felt when hearing about racial bigotry, animal cruelty, greed, or 
other behaviors that occur elsewhere. To be sure, the law says that 
locals have no right to regulate their residents extra-territorially. And 
that may be a good rule from a normative perspective. But like many 
constitutional rules, it is not a rule designed to maximize preference 
satisfaction. It suggests that we should ignore some preferences (like 
my preference that you not use marijuana in your town), not satisfy 
them. 
It is quite likely that marijuana prohibitions are motivated at least 
in part by majority judgments that the use of this mind-altering drug 
is immoral and not just (or even) physically dangerous.106 Residents 
espousing such moral judgments might be no better off under localism, 
and might even be worse off if they could command a majority 
statewide, because local control does not enable them to block or 
condemn troublesome conduct occurring in other parts of their state. 
To the extent that moralistic reasoning drives marijuana policy prefer-
ences, it also undermines the claim that marijuana localism will neces-
sarily boost preference satisfaction.  
Marijuana tourism could also undermine the interests of tourist 
destinations, notwithstanding the business it generates for them. Call 
this the “crashing the party problem.” For one thing, marijuana tour-
ism enables outsiders to enjoy many of the benefits that tourist 
destinations generate without paying the full costs of those benefits.107 
Marijuana destinations like Denver are supplying a drug that has 
medical value, recreational value, or both to nonresidents. To illustrate, 
suppose that Colorado Springs bans marijuana shops and Denver allows 
them; suppose as well that some Colorado Springs residents enjoy using 
marijuana and make the short trek to Denver to buy and consume the 
drug. In this case, local activity in Denver is conferring an external 
benefit on the community of Colorado Springs. Denver cannot easily 
charge outsiders for this benefit. Neither can it recoup the costs those 
outsiders inflict while in Denver. For example, after consuming 
marijuana, those Colorado Springs residents might cause accidents, 
brawls, and other disorderly conduct that harms the citizens of Denver.  
106. Research on the determinants of preferences toward alcohol policy is 
instructive. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (finding correl-
ations between religious beliefs and preferences toward alcohol policy). In 
particular, Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee posit the following possibility: 
[D]ry voters prefer to ban sales in all districts because they oppose 
drinking for moral reasons. These voters may oppose decentral-
ization because they are worse off if other individuals drink. 
Similarly, wet voters may be opposed to restricting the sale of 
liquor in any district if they feel that such restrictions impair the 
way of life that is typical for members of their group.  
 Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 14. 
107. In other words, tourists from other jurisdictions engage in free-riding. 
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In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that outsiders will create more 
problems than locals because (1) their connection to the local 
community is weaker, so they feel less inhibited while there; (2) their 
lack of familiarity with the local environment may make them more 
prone to accidents; (3) they have to travel farther than residents to 
consume marijuana, so they might drive longer distances under the 
influence of marijuana;108 (4) they may be more inclined to overindulge 
since they have limited access back home; and (5) on average, tourists 
may be less experienced with marijuana use and thus more susceptible 
to—or simply less aware of—its psychoactive effects. 
Legal and economic forces arguably prevent tourist destinations 
from satisfactorily addressing the burdens imposed by outsiders. As 
discussed, tourist destinations may not deny outsiders the legal 
privileges they confer upon their own residents.109 In other words, once 
a community allows its own residents to buy and consume marijuana 
it must allow non-residents to do so on the same terms.110 For example, 
a community may not charge outsiders a discriminatorily high tax on 
legal marijuana purchases.111 To be sure, communities can make it 
comparatively difficult to consume marijuana locally. For example, 
Denver, like many other jurisdictions that allow marijuana sales, 
nonetheless prohibits public consumption of the drug. According to the 
city’s retail marijuana use FAQ page,  
Retail marijuana is intended for private, personal use . . . . [I]t is 
illegal to consume marijuana in public. This includes but is not 
limited to areas accessible to the public such as transportation 
facilities, schools, amusement/sporting/music venues, parks, 
playgrounds, sidewalks and roads and outdoor and rooftop cafes. 
It is also illegal to smoke at indoor-but-public locations like bars, 
restaurants and common areas in buildings.112 
 
108. Cf. Israel Colón, County-Level Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Fatal 
Motor Vehicle Accidents, 14 J. Safety Res. 101, 103–04 (1983) (report-
ing that states with county level alcohol prohibitions actually have higher 
levels of car fatalities, possibly because drinkers from dry counties must 
drive farther to obtain alcohol). 
109. See generally Denning, supra note 17 (discussing the constitutional limits 
on state government power to discriminate against out-of-state residents’ 
purchases of marijuana). 
110. See id. at 2283–98 (discussing the constitutional limits on a state’s ability 
to discriminate against nonresidents).  
111. Cf. id. at 2285. 
112. Denver Marijuana Use, supra note 80. Bans on public consumption are 
reminiscent of the early anti-saloon laws that both pre- and post-dated 
Prohibition. For a discussion of this early anti-saloon movement, see 
Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition 83–
95 (2010) (chronicling the efforts of the temperance movement)..  
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Such bans on public consumption arguably encourage buyers to 
consume marijuana in the privacy of their own homes, which, in the 
case of tourists, often means somewhere outside the confines of the 
point-of-sale community. But tourists still have several options for 
consuming marijuana near the point of sale, including on marijuana 
tour buses, in member-only clubs, and in marijuana-friendly hotels.113 
In any event, tourists and residents alike probably face minimal legal 
risk using marijuana in public, as long as they do so discreetly—for 
example, by using odorless and smokeless marijuana vaporizer pens.114  
Neither can tourist destinations easily recoup the costs that 
nonresidents might impose on them. Destinations like Denver do, of 
course, generate tax revenues from marijuana tourism.115 But it is 
difficult for any destination to charge nonresidents a sufficiently high 
Pigouvian tax to fully compensate for the unique costs they impose. To 
begin, as noted, destinations cannot simply charge nonresidents a 
higher tax rate than locals, even if those nonresidents are likely to inflict 
more harm than locals.116 To recoup its full costs, a destination 
community would need to raise taxes on its own residents as well. But 
as discussed above, imposing local marijuana taxes creates its own set 
of problems; namely, the tourist destination might simply drive its own 
residents to purchase marijuana elsewhere. The scenario depicts a 
classic collective action problem; communities absorb the harms of local 
activity, but they are unable to exclude outsiders from enjoying the 
benefits of that activity.117 
 
113. See 60 Minutes: Colorado Welcomes Cannabis-Curious Tour (CBS News 
television broadcast Jan. 11, 2015), available at http://www.cbs 
news.com/news/colorado-welcomes-cannabis-curious-tourists/ (reporting 
on Denver amenities such as marijuana tour buses and “bud and 
breakfast” establishments).  
114. See Miles Bryan, Pot Smoke and Mirrors: Vaporizer Pens Hide Marijuana 
Use, NPR, (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/health/2014/04/18/302992602/pot-smoke-and-mirrors-vaporizer-
pens-hide-marijuana-use (noting that many public smokers use handheld 
vaporizers or vape pens because they are “easy to hide”). 
115. See Denver Rev. Mun. Code § 53-86 (declaring that Denver’s 
marijuana tax is designed to pay the expenses of, inter alia, “public health 
programs to mitigate any negative consequences associated with the 
consumption of marijuana”). See also Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana 
Distribution, supra note 17, at 226–32 (discussing the rationale behind 
vice taxes).  
116. Such discrimination would plainly violate the dormant commerce clause, 
though Brannon Denning makes a strong case that not all discrimination 
against outsiders would violate the Constitution. See Denning, supra note 
14, at 2298–99 (arguing that discriminatory quantity limitations could 
survive constitutional scrutiny). 
117. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 30, at 117 (“When activities spilled over 
from one state to another, the Framers recognized that the actions of 
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The residents of communities that legalize marijuana might be 
aggrieved for a second reason as well. They cannot travel and enjoy 
easy access to marijuana in other communities that prohibit sales of 
drug. In other words, they cannot take their home communities’ 
privileges into neighboring communities and must abide by their 
disagreeable laws. Not surprisingly, these residents do not want to be 
denied access to a drug that gives them joy, medical relief, or both.118 
Thus, while they might be pleased if their local community permits the 
distribution of marijuana, they might be even happier if the entire state 
(or nation) were to do the same. In other words, marijuana localism 
will not necessarily improve their well-being vis-à-vis federalism or 
nationalism because they too are not necessarily indifferent to how their 
neighbors regulate the drug. 
* * * 
In sum, the desirability of marijuana localism hinges on empirical 
claims about the extent to which local communities disagree about 
marijuana policy and the extent to which local governments can 
address the concerns that matter to their residents. On the one hand, 
local majorities clearly disagree about how best to regulate marijuana 
sales. Localism would thus appear to boost satisfaction in communities 
that would disagree with the way their state would regulate such sales. 
But the appeal of localism may prove illusory. The mobility of 
marijuana and of its users undermines the efficacy of any local controls. 
In other words, localism will not necessarily give people what they 
really want—like a reduction in marijuana consumption or an increase 
in tax revenues or an increase in access to the drug. It is thus not safe 
to assume that local majorities have something to gain from localism, 
or that statewide majorities have nothing to lose by acceding to it.  
III. The Lessons from Alcohol Localism 
The normative desirability of local marijuana regulation hinges to 
a great extent on an empirical assessment of the external effects of local 
marijuana activity. There is, as yet, far too little research examining 
the effects of local marijuana activity on outside communities to 
provide much guidance on the local option question. Fortunately, 
 
individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation as a 
whole—the definition of a collective action problem.”). 
118. See Pat Oglesby, Laws to Tax Marijuana, Tax Analysts, Jan. 24, 2011, 
at 255 (“The theory behind medical marijuana is hard to reconcile with 
local option, at least for possession. It’s hard for a state to say sick people 
in only some of its localities can use medicine.”). See also Strumpf & 
Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 14 (acknowledging that “wet voters 
may be opposed to restricting the sale of liquor in any district if they feel 
that such restrictions impair the way of life that is typical for members 
of their group”).  
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however, we can look to other policy domains for answers. Alcohol 
policy is one promising candidate. In this Part, this Article mines 
research on the nation’s lengthy experience with local alcohol control 
for insights into the desirability of similar local control over marijuana. 
Local communities have long regulated the sale and even possession 
of alcoholic beverages. Following the demise of national Prohibition, 
the temperance movement succeeded in securing the local option in 
thirty out of forty-two states that had legalized alcohol by 1935.119 In 
little time, nearly 1,000 localities had exercised their option to ban 
alcohol sales.120 Though the popularity of outright prohibition has 
waned over time,121 some communities continue to ban sales of alcohol 
and others impose a variety of less onerous restrictions on distribution. 
The result is a patchwork of dry, damp, and wet communities in local 
option states.  
The existence of this patchwork of regulations suggests that local 
communities disagree about the desirability of alcohol distribution and 
what government should do about it. Indeed, studies demonstrate that 
local decisions to legalize or prohibit alcohol sales reflect “the 
characteristics and preferences of county voters, such as religious affili-
ation, political ideology, economic interests associated with alcohol 
availability, alcohol restrictions in surrounding counties, and demo-
graphic factors.”122 For example, some Protestant denominations are 
firmly opposed to the consumption of alcohol, and communities where 
those denominations command a majority are more likely to ban the 
sale of alcohol outright.123 In their study of local alcohol policies, 
Professors Koleman Strumpf and Felix Oberholzer-Gee also find 
evidence that preference heterogeneity drives support for localism itself: 
We argue that a state’s choice of whether or not to decentralize 
liquor control is related to the degree of preference heterogeneity, 
 
119. See Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 5–8.  
120. See id. at 10. 
121. See id. at 8–10 (reporting that total number of dry counties fell by roughly 
40% between 1935 and 1970). See also Baughman et al., supra note 66 
(reporting that thirty-three dry Texas counties voted to legalize alcohol 
sales between 1975 and 1996). 
122. Robert W. Brown et al., Endogenous Alcohol Prohibition and Drunk Driv-
ing, 62 S. Econ. J. 1043, 1046 (1996). 
123. Id. at 1048 (finding a positive correlation between Baptists’ percentage of 
population and county’s dry status); see also Kenneth J. Meier & Cathy 
M. Johnson, The Politics of Demon Rum: Regulating Alcohol and Its 
Deleterious Consequences, 18 Am. Pol. Q. 404, 413 (1990) (finding a 
positive correlation between reformist groups’ percentage of population 
and dry status); Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 22–23 
(finding a positive correlation between Baptists’, Calvinists’, and 
Methodists’ percentage of population and dry status). 
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and we have found empirical support for this conclusion using a 
rich data set over the period 1934–70. The logic underlying the 
economic theory of federalism appears to drive actual policy 
choices.124 
Given these heterogeneous preferences toward alcohol policy, it would 
appear that alcohol localism could satisfy more voters.  
But it arguably takes more than passing laws to boost preference 
satisfaction. After all, people want to see results from these laws.125 And 
whether local alcohol controls deliver the results people want depends 
to a large degree on whether local alcohol policies have effects on 
neighboring communities. On that score, the same obstacles I argued 
might prevent local communities from successfully controlling 
marijuana would presumably also prevent them from successfully 
controlling alcohol. Namely, alcohol could be smuggled from 
neighboring communities, though perhaps not quite as easily as 
marijuana; and alcohol could be consumed in neighboring communities, 
probably even more easily than marijuana. Given the similar obstacles 
confronting marijuana and alcohol localism—and the similar objectives 
animating controls—the nation’s experience with local alcohol 
regulation provides a good test of the efficacy and desirability of local 
marijuana controls as well.  
So do local alcohol controls actually work? Social scientists have 
conducted a number of studies examining the impact of local access 
controls on alcohol consumption and other variables of interest, espec-
ially traffic fatalities. I scoured research databases to track down any 
study estimating the impact of local option laws on two key variables 
of interest—alcohol consumption and alcohol related traffic harms. 
While the studies I found are not unanimous, they find surprisingly 
little evidence that the local option actually has the desired impact on 
consumption and harms, arguably because alcohol is commonly 
available in neighboring communities.  
First, consider the impact of local access controls on the 
consumption of alcohol. While prohibitions and restrictions on the sale 
of alcohol are designed in large part to curb alcohol consumption,126 
local access controls appear to have little if any demonstrable impact. 
In one study, Professors Kenneth Meier and Cathy Johnson examined 
the impact of both local alcohol prohibitions and statewide sales 
 
124. Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 32.  
125. See Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 318–19 (“If prohibition has the 
potential to limit individual freedom, stunt economic growth, and 
stigmatize a community, it is reasonable for residents to expect certain 
benefits in return. If no effectiveness can be demonstrated, the level of 
control exercised over members of the community may be unwarranted.”). 
126. See id. at 323 (“The primary emphasis of countywide prohibition is to 
reduce drinking by denying access to alcohol.”). 
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restrictions on statewide per capita consumption of alcohol (among 
other things),127 controlling for relevant demographic characteristics. 
The authors found no statistically significant relationship between the 
percentage of a state’s population living in a dry county and the state’s 
per capita alcohol consumption.128 By contrast, they did find that state 
imposed sales regulations were associated with lower alcohol 
consumption.129 In a similar, earlier study, Professor Julian Simon 
likewise failed to find any relationship between a state’s dry population 
and the consumption of liquor in the state.130  
To be sure, scholars have established a positive relationship 
between access to alcohol and alcohol consumption. For example, Carla 
Campbell and her coauthors reviewed five studies of the impact of 
outlet density, i.e., the number of alcohol vendors per capita, on 
consumption and reported that all of them found “increased density 
was associated with increased consumption, and vice versa.”131 As the 
authors note, however, it is not clear what caused the differences in 
outlet density in the first instance,132 thus making it impossible to credit 
local policies for the reduction in alcohol consumption. After all, these 
communities might have fewer alcohol outlets because they have less 
demand for alcohol, and not because they legally limit the number of 
vendors.  
Local alcohol bans may have only muted impact on consumption 
because residents of dry counties can easily obtain alcohol in neighbor-
ing communities. Campbell and her coauthors found support for this 
hypothesis by comparing the impact of local alcohol bans in isolated 
versus less isolated communities.133 In the former, consisting of isolated 
Alaskan villages, residents faced far greater difficulty obtaining alcohol  
127. See Meier & Johnson, supra note 123, at 406.  
128. Id. at 419 (claiming that “[t]he model explains 86% of variation in per 
capita alcohol sales” and that “[t]hree policies have no impact on the level 
of alcoholic beverage consumption—dry population, tax rates, and 
treatment facilities”). 
129. Id. (noting that “[a]lcohol sales regulation, on the other hand, has a 
significant negative impact on alcoholic-beverage sales”).  
130. Julian L. Simon, The Economic Effects of State Monopoly of Packaged-
Liquor Retailing, 74 J. Pol. Econ. 188, 193 (1966) (“It is . . . surprising 
that percentage of population in ‘dry’ counties was not significant, even 
though there must be some sociological relationship between prohibition 
and consumption.”). 
131. Campbell et al., The Effectiveness of Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density as 
a Means of Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related 
Harms, 37 Am. J. Preventative Med. 556, 560 (2009). 
132. See id. at 559 (noting that prior studies “directly evaluated the effect of 
changes in outlet density over time without identifying the causes for 
density changes”). 
133. Id. at 564.  
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in violation of strict local prohibitions. Not surprisingly, “[a]ll of the 
studies that evaluated the effect of bans in isolated northern 
communities found substantial reductions in alcohol-related harms with 
the exception of suicide.”134 But less encouragingly, for localism 
proponents, Campbell and her coauthors also found that bans adopted 
by less-isolated communities produced at best “mixed results.”135 The 
authors concluded that “[t]he effectiveness of bans in reducing alcohol-
related harms appears to be highly dependent on the availability of 
alcohol in the surrounding area.”136  
Consider, next, the impact local controls appear to have on drunk 
driving and the injuries caused thereby. Drunk driving constitutes one 
of the most salient harms of alcohol consumption and one of the 
primary rationales for restricting access to alcohol.137 The problem is 
that there is little evidence that local prohibitions on the sale of 
alcohol—the strictest control a locality could adopt—actually reduce 
the rate of drunk-driving harms in a state. It appears that local access 
controls either do not curb drunk driving in dry counties—hardly 
surprising, given the limited impact they have on consumption, as 
noted above—or else they simply displace this harm onto neighboring 
wet counties.  
Researchers have examined the potential impact of local bans on 
local accident rates. Early studies in this vein produced mixed results.138  
134. Id. at 563. See also Berman et al., supra note 72, at 315 (noting that 
“[m]ore restrictive measures (dry) have no effect on suicide rates,” but 
“[a]ccident and homicide death rates fall . . . in the group of communities 
going dry”); Wood & Gruenewald, supra note 72, at 400 (noting that 
while “dry villages were safer than wet villages . . . the incidence of self-
harm was similar for wet and dry villages”).  
135. Campbell et al., supra note 131, at 563. Campbell et al.’s assessment of 
local controls might have been even more dismissive had they also 
reviewed the Meier & Johnson and Simon studies discussed above. 
136. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).  
137. See, e.g., Donald S. Kenkel, Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The 
Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies, 36 J. L. & Econ. 
877, 877 (1993) (“It is estimated that alcohol is involved in approximately 
half of all fatal accidents. The deaths and injuries of nondrinking drivers, 
passengers, and pedestrians both arouse public opinion and provide a 
clear-cut efficiency rationale for policies to correct the negative 
externalities.”); Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 323 (“The primary 
emphasis of countywide prohibition is to reduce drinking by denying 
access to alcohol. By logical extension, the reduction of drinking should 
result in fewer alcohol-related problem behaviors such as DUI.”). 
138. See, e.g., Russell G. Winn & David Giacopassi, Effects of County-Level 
Alcohol Prohibition on Motor Vehicle Accidents, 74 Soc. Sci. Q. 783, 
784 (1993) (“The few studies [to date] that have specifically examined 
the impact of consensual local prohibition (dry by choice) come to very 
different conclusions about its effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related 
problems.”). 
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In one study, for example, Professors Thomas Dull and David 
Giacopassi modeled the impact of different local access controls on 
automobile fatalities and other harms in Tennessee’s ninety-five 
counties.139 In one model, the authors found that county-level prohibit-
ions actually increased fatalities, and they hypothesized this could be 
“a result of individuals leaving their dry county to drink in damp or 
wet counties and being killed in auto crashes on their way home.”140 In 
another model, they found no relationship between county prohibitions 
and fatalities, thereby lending no support for the notion that local bans 
actually reduce driving harms—though also undermining their finding 
that local prohibitions could actually increase them.141 In a subsequent 
study, Professors Russell Winn and David Giacopassi examined the 
impact of local prohibitions on average automobile accidents in 
Kentucky over a four-year period and found that “dry counties have 
significantly lower rates of nonfatal and property accidents,”142 but not 
fatal accidents, after controlling for demography, geography, and police 
budgets.143 The authors concluded that “whether a county is wet or dry 
does affect the rate of automobile crashes. However, caution is in order 
since numerous factors other than alcohol availability affect the rate of 
automobile accidents.”144 In a similar study, Professor Robert Brown 
and his coauthors analyzed average traffic fatalities in Texas’s 254 
counties from 1988 to 1992.145 The authors categorized each county as 
either wet (201) or dry (53) circa 1993 and again controlled for 
demography, geography, and police budgets.146 In a refinement of the 
Winn and Giacoppassi study, however, Brown and his coauthors also 
 
139. See R. Thomas Dull & David J. Giacopassi, Dry, Damp, and Wet: Cor-
relates and Presumed Consequences of Local Alcohol Ordinances, 14 Am. 
J. Drug Alcohol Abuse 499, 502–05 (1988) (describing the method-
ology of the study). 
140. Id. at 505. 
141. See id. at 507 (noting that their “findings suggest that factors other than 
the alcohol ordinance may be primarily responsible for many of the so-
called alcohol-related conditions and behaviors.”).  
142. Winn & Giacopassi, supra note 138, at 790.  
143. Id. at 788 (“The variables include population density, percentage of 
county population which belongs to a church, per capita income, 
percentage of population below poverty line, miles of roads, percentage of 
roads classified as primary, police officers per 1,000 population, police 
officers per mile of road, and percent minority.”). 
144. Id. at 791.  
145. Brown et al., supra note 122, at 1048 (“Fatal alcohol-related motor vehicle 
accidents are averaged over five years (1988–92), in order to minimize any 
random yearly fluctuations, and then divided by the number of lane miles 
of road in a county.”). 
146. Id. at 1047–49. 
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attempted to address concerns over endogeneity, namely, the possibility 
that “[o]bserved variations in alcohol-related behavior may reflect 
differences in the characteristics of voters, rather than differences in 
how individuals react to policy-induced changes in their constraints.”147 
Using a measure of the local tourism industry as a proxy for demand 
for drunk driving,148 the authors found that county prohibitions had a 
statistically significant impact on alcohol-related fatalities.149  
These early studies of the local impact of county prohibitions 
arguably suffered from several shortcomings discussed below. More 
recent studies of county-level effects arguably address these 
shortcomings and consistently find little support for the proposition 
that local alcohol prohibitions actually curb drunk-driving-related 
harms. In a 2001 study, for example, Professor Reagan Baughman and 
his coauthors re-examined the impact of local access controls in Texas 
on automobile fatalities.150 The authors made three refinements to the 
Brown study noted above. First, they examined automobile fatalities 
over a twenty-one-year period, whereas the Brown study examined only 
five years of data and further averaged yearly accident rates over that 
period—a problem given several changes to Texas law during that 
span.151 Second, Baughman and his coauthors used county-specific fixed 
effects to account for the effects of unobservable variables—that is, 
effects that might be mistakenly attributed to local prohibitions or 
other observable variables (such as tourism).152 Like other researchers, 
 
147. Id. at 1043–44.  
148. See id. at 1047 (“The percentage of county population employed in the 
tourism industry, presumably highly dependent on alcohol sales, is used 
to measure the extent to which industry forces can affect alcohol avail-
ability.”).  
149. Id. at 1049 (estimating the effect “crudely translates into 2.145 more fatal 
alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents per year for the average [wet] 
county”).  
150. Baughman et al., supra note 66. 
151. See id. at 1091 (noting the study included accidents from 1975 to 1996). 
In particular, the Brown et al. study uses average yearly fatalities from 
1988 to 1992 as the dependent variable and legal status in 1993 as the 
independent variable. See Brown et al., supra note 122, at 1047–48 
(noting that while “other factors” are presumed “constant,” the study 
observes the variation of the average of “[f]atal alcohol-related motor 
vehicle accidents”). The problem is that the legal status of at least 
fourteen of those counties changed during the time period between 1988 
and 1992. See Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1092 (reporting the 
legal status changes in Fig. 1). It is worth noting that other studies have 
similarly employed averages of harm statistics, but the Baughman et al. 
study does not.  
152. Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1090 n.4 (noting that “Brown et 
al. . . . use[s] local tourism as an instrument for alcohol policy” and that 
“[w]ithout a county fixed effect, local tourism revenue may not be a valid 
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the authors also controlled for key observable variables that could 
impact drinking and driving, including the “number of registered 
vehicles, highway expenditures, police expenditures, religious 
affiliations, population, per-capita income, and vehicle miles driven.”153 
Including county-specific fixed effects, the authors found the correlation 
between dry status and reductions in alcohol-related accidents to be 
“spurious.”154 They concluded that local dry status has a “negligible 
and perhaps slightly negative effect [i.e., an increase] on the expected 
number of accidents.”155 Third, the authors also subdivided each of 
Texas’s 254 counties into several discrete categories based on the 
stringency of access controls,156 on the theory that the simple wet versus 
dry classification could mask important differences among counties 
falling within those broad categories.157 In so doing, the authors again 
found that local access controls increased the rate of automobile deaths 
in a county.158 The authors hypothesized that “the effect on alcohol-
related accidents of consumers driving a shorter distance more than 
offsets the effect of any increase in consumption” attributable to more 
relaxed controls.159 
In a 2004 study of DUI offenses in Arkansas, Professors Edward 
Powers and Janet Wilson sought to better control for differences in the 
enforcement of drunk-driving laws across counties. To do so, the 
authors calculated the amount of police time actually devoted to 
 
instrument if unobserved determinants of local tourism revenue are also 
related to the unobserved factors influencing highway safety”).  
153. Id. at 1091. 
154. Id. at 1093.  
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1091 (“Specifically, we observe whether the county allows the sale 
of beer and/or wine, whether the county allows the sale of all liquors for 
off-premise consumption and whether the county allows all types of 
alcohol to be sold for off-premise and on-premise consumption.”). 
157. See id. at 1093–95 (explaining that “previous models impose the restrict-
ion that law changes from dry to any local access have the same effect on 
highway safety. In addition, moving from one wet status such as access 
to beer and wine to another such as access to off-premise consumption of 
all liquors is assumed to have no effect on the expected number of 
accidents. To relax this restriction, we include[d] indicator variables for 
the specific type of alcohol access granted within each county.”). The Dull 
& Giocapassi study discussed in the text is an exception because it 
similarly divided Tennessee counties into five basic legal categories. See 
Dull & Giacopassi, supra note 139, at 502–03 (dividing alcohol access laws 
into five major categories: dry, semidry, damp, on-premise consumption, 
and wet). 
158. Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1095 (noting that “all three local 
access laws are associated with an increase in expected accidents”). 
159. Id.  
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combatting drunk driving rather than the amount spent combatting all 
crimes, the control used in earlier studies.160 Employing this refined 
control, the authors found “no significant relationship” between county 
prohibition and county DUI arrest rates.161 The authors concluded the 
following: 
Lack of local access to alcohol is more likely to relocate alcohol 
use rather than eliminate it. Dry county residents who desire 
alcohol must often travel many miles to the nearest legal point of 
sale. In Arkansas—a thinly populated state deficient in public 
transportation—this almost always means driving to obtain a 
drink.162 
 The studies above suggest that wet jurisdictions may be 
undermining the efforts of dry counties to curb consumption of alcohol 
and one of its most serious harms. But other studies suggest that dry 
counties might actually be displacing drunk-driving harms onto wet 
counties. To assess whether alcohol tourism poses this problem, 
Professor Sarah Lynn Schulte Gary and her colleagues analyzed details 
of more than 39,000 alcohol-related automobile crashes in Kentucky, 
including the location of crashes and the county of residence of 
drivers.163 The authors found that wet and dry counties had 
significantly similar, though not identical, rates of alcohol-fueled 
crashes.164 The authors speculated that “[p]eople from dry counties may 
be purchasing alcohol in a wet county and drinking at home or with 
neighbors and friends.”165 Even more interestingly, however, the authors 
found that compared to wet county residents, dry county residents are 
 
160. Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 322. The authors note that total 
police budgets do not necessarily reflect the effort expended policing 
drunk driving. Id. (“Jurisdictions that possess high rates of crime in other 
categories may be forced to direct resources away from traffic patrol as 
the focus is shifted to other crimes perceived as more important.”). It is 
thus possible that controlling only for total police budgets will fail to 
accurately account for the impact that police sobriety checkpoints and 
similar measures have on drunk driving offenses. To address this concern, 
Powers & Wilson control for both the “proportionate number of sworn 
officers and the non-DUI arrest rate per officer.” Id. at 331. 
161. Id.  
162. Id. at 332. 
163. Sarah Lynn Schulte Gary et al., Consideration of Driver Home County 
Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Vehicle Crashes, 35 Accident Analysis 
and Prevention 641 (2003). 
164. See id. at 645 (6.3% in wet versus 5.8% in dry). 
165. Id. 
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1.5 times more likely to be the involved in an alcohol-related crash.166 
Given the slightly lower rates of DUI offenses occurring in dry counties, 
it appears that dry county residents are consuming alcohol in wet 
counties and are causing accidents there—indeed, dry county residents 
committed nearly one-fourth (24.5%) of their DUI offenses in wet 
counties.167 The authors concluded that “county-level prohibition is not 
necessarily effective in improving highway safety. In fact it may be 
counterproductive in that individuals are driving farther under the 
influence of alcohol, thus, increasing their exposure to crashes.”168  
In similar fashion, studies have also found that local prohibitions 
on alcohol sales produce little if any impact on the total incidence of 
drunk driving statewide. In one study, Professor Frank Chaloupka and 
his coauthors found that the percentage of a state’s population living 
in a dry county had little or no impact on total driving deaths in the 
state.169 The authors concluded that “local limits on the sale of alcoholic 
beverages have little effect on drunk driving,” and they speculated that 
the lack of impact “may be due to the fact that alcohol could be 
purchased easily in nearby counties.”170 Similarly, the Meier and 
Johnson study discussed earlier found that local alcohol prohibitions 
had no impact on statewide nighttime traffic fatalities,171 though it is 
worth noting that state-imposed alcohol sales restrictions did reduce 
fatalities.172 Even more stunningly, Professor Christopher Ruhm has 
found that automobile fatalities are “positively and significantly related 
to . . . the percentage of the population living in dry counties in most 
 
166. Id. (finding that .29% of dry county residents but only .19% of wet county 
residents were involved in alcohol-related crashes). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 648. 
169. See Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-
Vehicle Fatalities, 22 J. Legal Stud. 161, 183 (1993) (“The variable 
measuring the percentage of state populations in dry counties is negative 
and significant only in a few specifications.”). 
170. Id. at 183. See also Colón, supra note 108, at 104 (finding the rate of car 
fatalities significantly higher in states with county level prohibitions than 
in states without and hypothesizing that county prohibitions might 
simply force drinkers to drive farther to obtain alcohol). 
171. A very high percentage of nighttime automobile fatalities are caused by 
drunk drivers. See Meier & Johnson, supra note 123, at 422 (“A common, 
accepted measure of drunk driving is nighttime fatalities because a high 
proportion are alcohol related.”). 
172. See id. at 423 (finding that “sales regulation, treatment capacity, dry 
population, and tax rates [all] have a negative relationship with nighttime 
traffic fatalities”). 
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specifications”173—i.e., banning alcohol locally may actually increase the 
rate of DUI, because it forces local drinkers to drive farther for a drink. 
Like Meier and Johnson, however, Ruhm found that certain state-
imposed measures, including minimum drinking ages and beer taxes, 
were more successful at reducing automobile fatalities.174  
Further evidence that dry counties may be foisting some of the 
harms of their own alcohol use onto wet counties comes from county 
decisions on legal status. In their fascinating study of the determinants 
of the local option, Professors Koleman Strumpf and Felix Oberholzer-
Gee analyzed factors influencing the alcohol policy choices of 3,100 
counties in the contiguous forty-eight states across a thirty-six-year 
period (1934–70).175 The authors found that several variables correlated 
with county decisions to restrict sales of liquor, including religious 
affiliations (as discussed above).176 More interestingly for present 
purposes, the authors found evidence of a strategic interaction among 
county policy choices. In other words, it appears that a county’s 
decision whether to allow or prohibit alcohol sales is influenced by what 
its neighbors have decided.177 The authors suggested that “being 
surrounded by wet neighbors lowers the cost of being wet, possibly 
because it decreases the number of drunk drivers from neighboring 
districts.”178  
To be sure, local governments are not completely helpless and there 
are undoubtedly some things they could do to reduce alcohol 
consumption and its related harms. In a study of three local 
communities, for example, Harold Holder and his coauthors found that 
adopting a broad array of measures, including limits on access, police 
sobriety checkpoints, community mobilization, and training of alcohol 
vendors, reduced the incidence of alcohol-related automobile injuries 
and other harms in the community.179 But for reasons explained above, 
 
173. Christopher J. Ruhm, Alcohol Policies and Highway Vehicle Fatalities, 
15 J. Health Econ. 435, 443 n.16 (1996). 
174. Id. at 451 (“[L]egal drinking ages are strongly negatively related to the 
fatalities of 18 to 20 year olds and . . . . higher beer taxes appear to reduce 
vehicle deaths . . . .”). 
175. Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 18. 
176. Id. at 22–24 (reporting results of empirical models). 
177. See id. at 24 (concluding that “local liquor policies are strategic 
compliments”). 
178. Id.; cf. Eugenia F. Toma, State Liquor Licensing, Implicit Contracting, 
and Dry/Wet Counties, 26 Econ. Inq. 507, 516 (1988) (hypothesizing, 
but not finding, a strategic interaction among county alcohol policies in 
Kentucky).  
179. See Harold D. Holder et al., Effect of Community-Based Interventions on 
High-Risk Drinking and Alcohol-Related Injuries, 284 JAMA 2341 (2000) 
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this is probably not the first choice of many dry communities.180 
Sobriety checkpoints, for example, could be an expensive alternative 
compared to broadening access controls.181  
* * * 
The experience with alcohol localism provides a sobering lesson. It 
appears that counties have encountered many of the problems that I 
predicted could plague local marijuana controls. Wet counties have 
probably undermined the controls imposed by dry counties, or dry 
counties have displaced their harms onto wet counties, or both. If 
alcohol localism has failed to meet expectations, why would we expect 
marijuana localism to fare any better?  
IV. Recommendations 
Building upon the foregoing assessment of marijuana localism, this 
Part proceeds to make some recommendations for the states. First, it 
briefly explains why states could reject marijuana localism if they so 
choose. Second, it surveys the choices the states have made so far 
concerning marijuana localism. Third, it recommends that states 
severely limit the role their local governments play in the marijuana 
policy domain.  
A. What States Could Do 
It is up to the states to decide whether or not to allow local 
governments to regulate marijuana sales. In other words, states do not 
necessarily have to tolerate local resistance to decisions made by 
statewide majorities. The states can prevent local governments from 
exercising authority over marijuana sales in two basic ways.  
First, states can withhold regulatory authority from local 
governments. Local governments are creatures of the state and derive 
all of their regulatory authority from the state.182 In other words, the 
 
(discussing the effects of community action on alcohol consumption and 
alcohol-related accidents). 
180. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the practical difficulties in pre-
venting marijuana smuggling. 
181. See Kenkel, supra note 137, at 909 (discussing relative costs of alternative 
policies to combat drunk driving). 
182. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1990) (“The local government is a creature 
of the state. It exists only by an act of the state, and the state, as creator, 
has plenary power to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will any or all 
local units. The local government is a delegate of the state, possessing 
only those powers the state has chosen to confer upon it.”).  
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states decide what powers local governments shall exercise.183 It follows 
that the states could withhold the power to regulate marijuana from 
local governments. Without the grant of authority from the state, local 
governments would be powerless to regulate the drug.  
This is a distinguishing feature of localism and one of the primary 
ways it differs from federalism. Unlike localities, the states are not 
creatures of the national government, and they do not require the 
national government’s blessing to pass legislation. The states are 
presumed to have authority to regulate for the health, safety, and 
morals of the population, with the exception of a few narrow instances 
under which the Constitution deprives them of authority.184 The states 
are, of course, entitled to limit their powers via their own constitutions; 
but the important point here is that the national Constitution does not 
impose such constraints, at least in ways that are relevant here. 
Now, to be sure, it is easier to withhold authority in some states 
than in others. In Dillon’s Rule states, local governments wield only 
those powers that are “indispensable to the purposes of their incorp-
oration as well as any others expressly bestowed upon them by the 
state.”185 Local governments in Dillon’s Rule states would need an 
express grant of authority from the state to regulate (ban, legalize, etc.) 
marijuana. If the state’s marijuana law was silent on the issue of local 
power, local governments presumably would lack authority to regulate 
the drug.  
In Home Rule states, by contrast, local governments are presumed 
to wield “any power the state possessed, unless the state legislature had 
exclusively reserved power over a particular subject matter to the 
state.”186 In California, for example, the state constitution expressly 
provides that “A county or city may make and enforce within its limits 
all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in 
conflict with general laws.”187 While a state may still withhold power 
from local governments, it must do so affirmatively—the courts will not 
presume the absence of power from silence, as they do in Dillon’s Rule 
states.  
 
183. Id. at 7–8 (noting that “[t]he local government is an agent of the state, 
exercising limited powers at the local level on behalf of the state”). 
184. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall enter into any treaty, 
alliance, or confederation . . . .”). 
185. Diller, supra note 31, at 1122–23 (emphasis added). 
186. Id. at 1125. As Diller notes, the majority of states have some form of 
Home Rule. Id. at 1126–27. See also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENVER 
U. L. REV. 1337, 1364–71 (2009) (discussing variation in home rule across 
states). 
187. Calif. Const. Art. XI § 7. 
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Second, states can also preempt local legislation.188 That is, even if 
a local government has express or implied authority to regulate mari-
juana, the state may still veto any local regulations adopted pursuant 
to this authority. Intrastate preemption follows the same basic rules as 
federal-state preemption.189 Local law is preempted when it conflicts 
with state law, with or without any express statement of the 
legislature’s preemptive intentions.190  
Importantly, the states have not encountered the same preemption 
barrier in enacting their most recent marijuana reforms. To the extent 
states have merely legalized marijuana—i.e., removed state prohibitions 
on marijuana—they have not done anything that Congress could 
preempt.191 And to the extent the states have gone beyond merely 
legalizing marijuana, they have done little that Congress would actually 
want to preempt.192 
Local governments would not fare so well against intra-state 
preemption claims. Local bans on marijuana sales are clearly 
preemptable, and private actors subject to those bans have every 
incentive to challenge the assertion of local authority. Local legalization 
of marijuana could prove more durable against an intra-state 
preemption challenge. But it is not clear there is any state law analog 
to the federal anticommandeering rule that would protect local 
communities from being forced to criminalize sales of marijuana.193 In 
other words, states might command local governments to ban 
marijuana, even though Congress could not command states to do the 
same. In any event, local legalization might not have much practical 
effect in the shadow of a statewide ban on marijuana. State law 
enforcement, for example, might have the resources needed to shut 
down locally regulated marijuana shops. The federal government, by 
contrast, has lacked the resources needed to clamp down on state- 
188. See Diller, supra note 31, at 1140–42 (discussing intrastate preemption). 
189. See id. at 1140 (“Despite some superficial distinctions, most states’ 
preemption analyses are similar in form to the federal model.”).  
190. See id. at 1140–53 (discussing the rules of implied conflict preemption in 
the states).  
191. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1445–50 
(arguing that Congress cannot stop states from merely legalizing 
marijuana under state law).  
192. See Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, supra note 
17, at 18 (explaining that Congress would not want to preempt state 
regulations that restrict the marijuana market—including state marijuana 
taxes, licenses, and similar measures—because those measures actually 
help to curb the marijuana market).  
193. Cf. Kevin Miller, Bill to Ban Local Votes on Legalizing Marijuana Draws 
Fire at Hearing, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 2, 2015 (discussing state 
legislative proposal that would bar local governments from voting on 
marijuana legalization proposals).  
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regulated shops,194 giving the states de-facto if not de-jure control  
over them.  
In sum, marijuana localism is on precarious legal footing. States 
have the power to determine the precise role, if any, local governments 
will play in the marijuana policy domain. To be sure, this choice may 
be more or less constrained, depending on the rules of state 
constitutional law, but it is one the states are clearly empowered  
to make.  
B. What States Have Done 
Twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for some purposes 
under state law. As of the November 2014 election, at least twenty-one 
of those states have also legalized some form of retail distribution of 
marijuana.195 But they have split regarding whether to allow local 
communities to ban retail distribution.  
 Seven states have authorized local governments to ban retail 
marijuana shops that are otherwise legal under state law.196 Five of 
these states have done so expressly via statute or ballot initiative.197 
For example, Amendment 64 specifies that “[a] locality may prohibit 
the operation of marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana product 
manufacturing facilities, marijuana testing facilities, or retail marijuana 
stores through the enactment of an ordinance or through an initiated 
or referred measure.”198 In the two other states, state laws failed to 
address the localism question, but key state authorities have found local 
bans to be consistent with state law. In California, the state supreme 
court upheld a local ban on medical marijuana dispensaries against a  
194. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1463–69 
(highlighting the federal government’s limited capacity to enforce its 
marijuana ban).  
195. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Hawaii and Michigan 
permit certain individuals to grow marijuana for their own medical 
purposes, but they do not formally permit retail distribution of the drug. 
See Robert A. Mikos, Expert Report in Allard v. Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of Canada (Oct. 2014) (surveying state laws governing 
distribution of marijuana as of fall 2014). Alaska voted to legalize the 
retail distribution of marijuana in November 2014. See Alaska Ballot 
Meas. 2, (2014).  
196. The states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Ver-
mont, and Washington.  
197. See Alaska Ballot Meas. 2, (2014); Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f), 
amended by Use and Regulation of Marijuana Amend. 64 (2012); S.B. 
423, 62nd Leg. (Mont. 2011); S.B. 374, 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013); S.B. 17, 
2011–12 Sess. (Vt. 2011). 
198. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f). 
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preemption challenge brought under the state’s long-standing medical 
marijuana law.199 It reasoned that state law “merely exempts” medical 
marijuana dispensaries from “prohibitions that would otherwise apply 
under state law. . . . [It] does not thereby mandate that local 
governments authorize, allow, or accommodate the existence of such 
facilities.”200 Similarly, in Washington, the state attorney general 
opined that local governments could ban retail marijuana shops, 
reasoning that the state’s law legalizing and regulating marijuana 
distribution did not “amount to entitling one to engage in such 
businesses regardless of local law.”201  
 Four states have denied local governments the power to ban retail 
marijuana shops.202 Three states have rejected the local option expressly 
via statute or ballot initiative.203 In Oregon, for example, Measure 91 
expressly provides that the essential portions of the measure are 
“designed to operate uniformly throughout the state, shall be 
paramount and superior to and shall fully replace and supersede any 
and all municipal charter enactments or local ordinances inconsistent 
with it. Such charters and ordinances hereby are repealed.”204 
Massachusetts’ medical marijuana law is silent regarding local 
authority over marijuana dispensaries. However, the state’s attorney 
general has invoked the law to block local communities from banning 
medical marijuana dispensaries outright.205 She noted that state law is 
 
199. See generally City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and 
Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494 (Cal. 2013) (upholding a local ban on 
medical marijuana dispensaries).  
200. Id. at 510.  
201. See Att’y Gen. of Wash., AGO 2014 No. 2, Whether Statewide 
Initiative Establishing Sys. for Licensing Marijuana Producers, 
Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordinances (2014) 
(concluding that “[l]ocal governments have broad authority to regulate 
within their jurisdictions, and nothing in 1-502 limits that authority with 
respect to licensed marijuana businesses”). 
202. The states include Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Oregon.  
203. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2806.01 (LexisNexis 2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 
16, §§ 4901A, 4917A (2014); Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 58 (2014). 
204. Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 58 (2014). Just prior to the passage of Measure 91, 
a lower state court had ruled that local governments could ban medical 
marijuana dispensaries. Noelle Crombie, Medical Marijuana in Oregon: 
Court Rules that Local Governments May Ban Dispensaries, The 
Oregonian, Oct. 17, 2014. 
205. Letter from Martha Coakley, Att’y Gen. Mass., to Mary K. Galvin, Town 
Clerk, Town of Wakefield (Mar. 13, 2013) available at http:// 
www.mass.gov/ago/docs/municipal/wakefield-6601.pdf [hereinafter Coa-
kley Letter] (concluding that “a town meeting vote to completely ban 
medical marijuana treatment centers . . . would frustrate the purpose of 
[state laws]”). The Massachusetts Attorney General has authority to 
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intended to give qualifying patients “reasonable access” to medical 
marijuana dispensaries, and to serve that end, it requires dispensaries 
to be “reasonably dispersed throughout the Commonwealth.”206 The 
attorney general reasoned that “This legislative purpose could not be 
served if a municipality could prohibit treatment centers within its 
borders, for if one municipality could do so, we see no principled basis 
on which every other municipality could not do the same.”207 
 Notwithstanding their firm rejection of local authority to ban 
marijuana shops, all of these states do allow local authorities to enact 
some reasonable regulations to govern them.208 For example, Measure 
91 permits localities to adopt “reasonable time, place and manner 
regulations of the nuisance aspects of establishments that sell 
marijuana” but only if “the city or county makes specific findings that 
the establishment would cause adverse effects to occur.”209  
In the remaining ten states that permit retail distribution of 
marijuana, the status of local power to ban marijuana shops remains 
unsettled because no statute expressly addresses the issue and no high 
court or other high–level state official has yet opined on the question.  
C. What States Should Do 
Not surprisingly, I strongly recommend that states limit local 
authority over marijuana. In light of the threat posed by marijuana 
smuggling and marijuana tourism, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
a large portion of a state’s population might be more satisfied living 
under imperfect but effective state regulations than under more 
agreeable but ineffective local regulations. To be sure, it is impossible 
to gauge with certainty localism’s net impact on total satisfaction in a 
state. But the fact that local communities do not bear the full costs 
and benefits of the marijuana policies they adopt suggests that states 
cannot expect those communities to necessarily adopt policies that 
enhance the well-being of the entire state. Because the state is the only 
forum in which all interested parties have a voice, I suggest the states 
 
disapprove of (i.e., block) a local bylaw when it is inconsistent with state 
law. Id. at 5. 
206. Id. at 6.  
207. Id.  
208. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2806.01 (LexisNexis 2010) (“Cities, towns and 
counties may enact reasonable zoning regulations that limit the use of 
land for registered nonprofit medical marijuana dispensaries to specified 
areas.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4901A, 4917A (2014) (preventing 
the local government from prohibiting a “registered compassion center”); 
Coakley Letter, supra note 205, at 1 (conceding that “municipalities are 
not prohibited from adopting zoning bylaws to regulate medical 
marijuana treatment centers, so long as such zoning by-laws do not 
conflict with the [Massachusetts Medical Marijuana] Act”); Or. Ballot 
Meas. 91, § 59(1) (2014). 
209. Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 59(1) (2014).  
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should reserve to themselves exclusive authority to decide key policy 
questions, like whether retail sales of marijuana are to be permitted and 
what tax shall be imposed upon them, and should not enable local 
communities to override state decisions.  
Local communities could still play a role in shaping marijuana 
policy. It would make sense for state regulators to listen to the concerns 
expressed by local officials. States could even allow local officials to 
formulate their own policy on matters that are less likely to impact 
people outside the community, like the location of and signage used by 
marijuana stores. This obviously will not give local communities 
everything they want, but it will limit the danger local communities 
pose to each other.  
Importantly, no matter what the states decide, they should address 
the localism issue early and clearly in legislation. Addressing localism 
this way should help reduce resort to costly and protracted litigation 
to settle the boundaries of local power. And addressing localism via 
statute could also result in a better allocation of power. There is no 
guarantee that the rule adopted by a court applying generic preemption 
principles will be the socially optimal one for marijuana. 
Conclusion 
In the battle for control of marijuana policy, the states have scored 
an impressive and surprising victory.210 Their reforms have not only 
survived but thrived in the shadow of a strict federal marijuana 
prohibition. In the process, the states have exposed the de jure and de 
facto limits to federal supremacy.  
But the states now face a very different challenge—managing the 
conflict within. Local governments are now clamoring for the right to 
opt out of state reforms, employing the same normative arguments the 
states used to defend their resistance to federal authority. Should the 
states accede to local control? 
This Article has examined the economic case for marijuana 
localism. While communities clearly disagree about marijuana policy, 
it is not clear that localism would enhance satisfaction. Disparities in 
local marijuana policies could trigger rampant marijuana smuggling 
and marijuana tourism, leaving many residents dissatisfied with local 
control. For these reasons, and heeding the sobering lessons of local 
alcohol control, the Article tentatively concludes that states should 
enjoy their apparent victory over the federal government, embrace 
marijuana federalism, and keep marijuana localism at bay.  
 
210. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1425 (“The 
states have not only kept the patient breathing, so to speak, in 
anticipation of a day when federal policy might change; they have, for all 
practical purposes, already made medical marijuana de facto legal within 
their jurisdictions.”). 
